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This dissertation critically examines the common law caveat subscriptor rule and argues against 
the strict application of the rule in the context of ‘contracts of necessity’ (which is defined in the 
research paper). I will begin by explaining what exactly the caveat subscriptor rule entails and 
how it functions within the realm of mistake in contract as a species of the reliance theory which 
the South African law of contract endorses. I will then proceed to outline the narrow grounds 
recognized by the courts to date upon which one may escape the working of the caveat 
subscriptor rule. In section II of the paper I will briefly discuss the rise of the consumer 
protection movement and consider the extent to which the Consumer Protection Act now 
provides added protection to the unwitting signatory against the strict application of the rule. In 
section III I will critically examine the underlying presumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule 
which purport to justify the existence and application of the rule itself. I will then proceed to 
illustrate that while the assumptions underlying the caveat subscriptor rule may have been 
accurate and relevant in the past, these assumptions are no longer in keeping with the modern era 
of mass marketing characterized by the widespread use of standard-form contracts and consumer 
non-readership, which is reflected in recent judgments dealing with unread contract terms. In 
section IV I will examine the modern reality of consumer non-readership caused by various 
innate psychological factors and behavioural biases, particularly in the context of contracts of 
necessity. In section V I show that a change in judicial attitude towards unread contract terms 
and increased fairness towards the signatory is warranted not only in light of modern consumer 
behavior, but also in light of the courts constitutional mandate to develop the common law in 
accordance with section 39 (2) of the Bill of Rights as well as its underlying values. In section VI 
will propose a new basis for escaping the strict application of the rule grounded in public policy 
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‘The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. 
The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.’ 
Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862 
 
‘It is a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, is 
taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning and effect of the words 
which appear over his signature.’ 
   Innes CJ in Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 
 
‘Real people don’t read standard form contracts. Reading is boring, 
incomprehensible, alienating, time consuming, but most of all 
pointless. We want the product, not the contract.’ 
Ben-Shahar, O ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract 
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AGAINST THE STRICT APPLICATION OF THE 
CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR RULE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF CONTRACTS OF NECESSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The caveat subscriptor rule is, essentially, a common law rule of contract law which relates to 
unread contracts or unread contract terms whereby the signatory is bound by the impression of 
assent created by his or her signature in the mind of the contract enforcer. The caveat subscriptor 
rule gains its legitimacy from several underlying assumptions such as the ‘duty to read’ which to 
date have received very little attention and which have yet to be truly scrutinized in light of 
modern commerce and consumer behavioural biases. However, these underlying assumptions 
have withered with time and are no longer in keeping with the ‘lived reality’ reflected in twenty-
first century consumer markets characterized by consumer non-readership, particularly when 
dealing with contracts of necessity. 
Drawing on a recent study published by the UK Office of Fair Trading,  I propose, for the 
purposes of this paper, that a ‘contract of necessity’ is one which involves the attainment of 
everyday essential goods or services, “on which a variety of consumers with different needs 
rely”,1 but to which they give little or no attention primarily due to the fact that the goods or 
services in question are a necessity (rather than a luxury or optional convenience) and therefore 
leave the consumer with no choice but to enter into the contract or go without the goods or 
services in question. A typical example of a ‘contract of necessity’ in the South African context 
would be a motor-vehicle insurance contract. The widespread occurrence of motor-vehicle 
accidents and motor-vehicle thefts in South Africa, considered in conjunction with the high costs 
                                                          
1 ‘Consumer Contracts’ published by the UK Office of Fair Trading in February 2011, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-studies/consumercontracts/oft1312.pdf, accessed on 27 May 2012. 
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of motor vehicles and the deficiencies of public transport, indicates the extremely high 
possibility of loss associated with motor vehicles. This in turn indicates the necessity of motor-
vehicle insurance for the average South African consumer. Consequently, in such circumstances, 
necessity in effect compels the insured to contract for insurance. 
The numerous circumstances of necessity that many South African consumers find themselves in 
on a daily basis, together with the vast inequality of society and disparity of wealth and resources 
that exist in South Africa, render the freedom of all contractants something of a fallacy. It will be 
shown that the very necessary nature of various goods or services, such as insurance or health 
care, which are attainable only through the conclusion of contracts, are one of the many factors 
which trigger various unseen psychological reactions and inherent behavioural biases which lead 
consumers to, and it is submitted, reasonably, not read consumer contracts of necessity.  
Consequently, a new approach to the caveat subscriptor rule is needed in order to ensure 
increased fairness towards the unwitting signatory - an approach that accounts for the realities of 
modern consumer behavior in order to truly protect vulnerable consumers by providing our 
judges with greater discretion or room to maneuver when adjudicating along the lines of mistake 
in contracting. Moreover, it is submitted that, in light of the often overlooked psychological 
factors and intrinsic behavioural biases at play at the time of contracting, a different set of rules 
should apply when dealing with negotiated contracts and non-negotiated standard-form 
consumer contracts of necessity. 
In section I below I will begin by explaining in detail what exactly the caveat subscriptor rule 
entails and how it functions within the realm of mistake in contract as a species of the reliance 
theory which the South African law of contract endorses. I will then proceed to outline the 
narrow grounds recognized by the courts to date upon which one may escape the working of the 
caveat subscriptor rule. In section II I will briefly discuss the rise of the consumer protection 
movement and consider the extent to which the Consumer Protection Act now provides added 
protection to the unwitting signatory against the strict application of the rule. In section III I will 
begin by critically examining the underlying presumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule which 
purport to justify the existence and application of the rule itself. I will then proceed to illustrate 
that while the assumptions underlying the caveat subscriptor rule may have been accurate and 
relevant in the past, these assumptions are no longer in keeping with the modern era of mass 
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marketing characterized by the widespread use of standard-form contracts and consumer non-
readership, which I contend is reflected in recent judgments dealing with unread contract terms. 
In section IV I will examine the modern reality of consumer non-readership caused by various 
innate psychological factors and behavioural biases, particularly in the context of contracts of 
necessity. I will then proceed in section V to show that a change in judicial attitude towards 
unread contract terms and increased fairness towards the unwitting signatory is warranted not 
only in light of modern consumer behavior, but also in light of the courts constitutional mandate 
to develop the common law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights as well as the founding constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom. In 
section VI I will propose a new basis for escaping the strict application of the rule grounded in 




















1.1 CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR – ‘LET THE SIGNATORY BEWARE’ 
The cautionary Latin maxim ‘caveat subscriptor’ literally means ‘Let the signatory beware’,2 or 
according to the Oxford Dictionary of Law, ‘Let the person signing be on his guard’.3 The phrase 
derives much of its impetus from the doctrine of freedom of contract, which is also referred to as 
the doctrine of contractual autonomy.4 For over a century, our courts have accepted the doctrine 
of freedom of contract as the cornerstone of the law of contract.5 In this regard the courts quite 
often quote from the leading English case of Printing and Numerical Registering Company v 
Sampson6 where Sir George Jessel MR held: 
“If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contract when 
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the Courts of 
Justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to 
interfere with this freedom of contract.”7 
A contract freely and willingly entered into by parties of competent capacity and understanding, 
which is lawful and not affected by any of the factors that may render it invalid, has a number of 
consequences. Two of these consequences are, for the purposes of this discussion, firstly that 
such a contract is valid and binding and is accordingly enforceable in a court of law. This is the 
doctrine of sanctity of contracts, referred to in Latin as the pacta sunt servanda principle and 
which has long been recognized and applied by our courts.8 The other consequence of 
concluding a contract is that by signing it, the signatory is said to create the impression in the 
                                                          
2 D Bhana, E Bonthuys & M Nortje Students Guide to the Law of Contract 2nd Ed (2009) 305. 
3 EA Martin & J Law Oxford Dictionary of Law 6th Ed (2006) 79. 
4 C Okpaluba Law and Contemporary South African Society (2004) 287. 
5 See D Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa 1st Ed (2009) 21; P Aronstam Consumer Protection, 
Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 1-16. 
6 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson [1875] LR 19 Eq 462. 
7 Ibid 465. 
8 Hutchison (note 5 above) 21. 
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mind of the other party that he assents to all its terms and provisions and accordingly agrees to be 
bound thereby.9 This is nothing other than the application of the caveat subscriptor rule. 
To say that this simple rule of our common law of contract has been well documented would be 
to put it lightly. The caveat subscriptor rule has been discussed ad nauseam and, like the 
imperious Latin dictum pacta sunt servanda, through decades of judicial enunciation, text-book 
repetition and scholarly critique has grown to appear axiomatic, if not mesmeric.10 The caveat 
subscriptor rule has long been one of the cornerstones of the South African law of contract:11 
Over a century ago, in Burger v Central South Railways,12 Chief Justice Innes expounded the 
seminal statement of the rule as follows: 
“It is a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, is taken to be bound by the 
ordinary meaning and effect of the words which appear over his signature.”13 
From a contractual perspective, and in simplified terms, the caveat subscriptor rule essentially 
entails that a party who has signs a contractual document will be bound to all terms contained in 
that document, regardless of whether or not he or she has read them or was subjectively willing 
to consent to them.14 A person, who signs a document which contains contractual terms, without 
                                                          
9 Okpaluba (note 4 above) 288. 
10 See Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571; George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A); 
Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2007 (4) SA 572 (WLD); Dole South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Pieter 
Beukes (Pty) Ltd 2007 (4) SA 577 (C); Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers 2007 (2) SA 599 
(SCA); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA); RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th Ed 
(2006) 174-179; Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 305; R Sharrock Business Transactions Law 8th Ed 
(2011) 76-77; E Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act 1st Ed (2009) 69; NJ Melville The Consumer 
Protection Act Made Easy 1st Ed (2011) 26; Aronstam (note 5 above) 11-12; Okpaluba (note 4 above) 287-302; J 
Barnard-Naude ‘The Decision in Hartley v Pyramid Freight (PTY) LTD: Justice Miscarried?’ (2007) 3 Stellenbosch 
LR 497; M Nortje ‘Of Reliance, Self-Reliance and Caveat Subscriptor’ (2012) 129 SALJ 132; C-J Pretorius ‘The 
Basis and Underpinnings of the Caveat Subscriptor Rule’ (2008) 71 THRHR 660; JB Cilliers ‘Caveat Subscriptor – 
Beware the Hidden Suretyship Clause’ (1996) 59 THRHR 168; TA Woker ‘Caveat Subscriptor: How Careful Are 
we expected to be?’ (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 109; L Steyn ‘The Inclusion of ‘Additional’ Terms or ‘Standard Terms 
and Conditions’ in a Contract: The Significance of the ‘Ticket’ Cases, caveat subscriptor and the Application of the 
Reliance Theory’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 106; C Lewis ‘Caveat Subscriptor and the Doctrine of Justus Error’ (1987) 
104 SALJ 371; PMA Hunt ‘Caveat Subscriptor’ (1963) 80 SALJ 457. 
11 M Nortje ‘Unexpected Terms and Caveat Subscriptor’ (2011) 128 SALJ 741, 741. 
12 Burger v Central South African Railways (note 10 above). 
13 Ibid 578. For a more contemporary formulation of the rule, see Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
(note 10 above) 575H: “There is a strong praesumptio hominis (popular presumption or presumption common 
among persons) that anyone who has signed a document had the animus (intention) to enter into the transaction 
contained in it, and she is burdened with the onus of convincing the Court that she in fact had not entered into the 
transaction by virtue of the maxim caveat subscriptor (a person who signs must be careful).” 
14 Christie (note 10 above) 174-175; Pretorius (note 10 above) 660-661; Nortje (note 11 above) 741. 
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considering all the terms that may apply, may be held bound thereto because of the impression of 
assent created by his or her signature.15 
There are instances where liability based on one’s signature can be avoided – that is, the rule is 
not applied without exception and within the realm of mistake a signatory who has signed a 
document without knowing or understanding all the terms of the document may be relieved from 
liability under the contract, but the grounds are very limited.16 However, in order to truly 
understand the workings of the caveat subscriptor rule and the circumstances under which one 
may be able to escape liability in terms of the rule, it is important to have an understanding of the 
different theories of contract which the South African law of contract endorses, as well as an 
understanding of mistake in contract law. I will briefly examine these two aspects of our law of 
contract, before returning to the caveat subscriptor rule. 
According to the will theory, the basis of contract is to be found in the individual will.17 As such, 
the will theory advances an extremely subjective approach to contract: Consensus is the sole 
basis of contractual liability, with the result that if there is no genuine concurrence of wills, there 
can be no contract.18 It is evident however, that absolute conformity to the will theory would 
produce results that are both unfair and economically disastrous, as every material mistake would 
always lead to an absence of contractual liability.19 It would be unfair because it fails to protect 
the reasonable expectations of a party who has relied on the objective appearance of consensus 
created by the other party’s conduct and economically disastrous because it ignores the need for 
legal certainty in commercial dealings.20 As will be shown below, the shortcomings of the will 
theory in the event of dissensus are corrected by employing the reliance theory. 
                                                          
15 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 305; Pretorius (note 10 above) 660; Woker (note 10 above) 110; C-J 
Pretorius ‘General Principles of the Law of Contract’ (2007) Annual Survey of South African Law 469, 472. 
16 Cilliers (note 10 above) 168. 
17 Hutchison (note 5 above) 15; S Van Der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract, 
General Principles 3rd Ed (2007) 22: “Without conscious consensus between the parties there can be no contract.” 
For a descriptive overview of the relationship between the different theories of contract, see AJ Kerr The Principles 
of the Law of Contract 6th Ed (2002) 20-25. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 30. 
20 Hutchison (note 5 above) 15: “Business people must be able to rely on signed documents and other objective 
indications of consent, knowing that they will be upheld as binding contracts by the courts; if they cannot do so, 
much commercial activity will grind to a halt.” For a more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the will theory, see Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 30-32. 
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According to the declaration theory, the proper basis of contract is to be found in the concurring 
declarations of the parties. The inner wills of the party are irrelevant; what is important for 
contract is not what the parties think but what they say or do – “the external manifestations of 
their wills.”21 The declaration theory is best described by the following statement of Wessels JA 
in South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd:22 
“The law does not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a contract, but with 
the external manifestation of their minds. Even therefore if from a philosophical standpoint the 
minds of the parties do not meet, yet, if by their acts their minds seem to have met, the law will, 
where fraud is not alleged, look at their acts and assume that their minds did meet and that they 
contracted in accordance with what the parties purport to accept as a record of their agreement.”23 
If, judged purely objectively, one party has made an offer that has been unambiguously accepted 
by the other party, there is a contract, irrespective of what either party actually had in mind at the 
time. However, by favouring form over substance, it could rather nonsensically result in a 
contract that neither party intended.24 Further, it would also permit parties to disguise their 
transactions. Consequently, there are serious doubts in respect of the practical viability of the 
declaration theory.25 
The reliance theory (also known as ‘the direct reasonable reliance theory’ and the doctrine of 
quasi-mutual assent26) protects a party’s “reasonable expectation of a contract.”27 The basis of 
contract is to be found in the reasonable belief in the existence of consensus, induced by the 
conduct of the other party.28 The reliance theory therefore complements the will theory, 
correcting its deficiencies and providing an alternate basis for contract in circumstances where 
                                                          
21 Hutchison (note 5 above) 15; Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 37. 
22 South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704. 
23 Ibid 715-716. 
24 To illustrate the shortcomings of an unqualified adherence to the declaration theory, Van Der Merwe, Van 
Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 37 provide the following example: “[I]f A offers to sell for 100 and 
B says: ‘I accept’, the contract of sale which may arise is for 100, even if A meant 1000 and B wanted to say: ‘I 
accept, but only at 50’. In fact, even if A and B meant 1000 there will still be a contract for 100.” 
25 Hutchison (note 5 above) 16. See also Kerr (note 17 above) 20-25 where the author suggests that the declaration 
theory should not be followed in the future: “A theory which disregards the mental attitude of every contracting 
party is unsupportable.” 
26 Christie (note 10 above) 175; Pretorius (note 10 above) 663; Nortje (note 11 above) 744.  




the minds of the parties to the contract have not truly met.29 This is the approach currently 
followed in our law of contract, as was confirmed by the then Appellate Division in Saambou-
Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman30 where Jansen JA reasserted that “the true basis of 
contractual liability in our law…is not the objective approach of the English law, but is – save in 
cases where the reliance theory is applied – the real consensus of the parties.”31 
Consequently, if the parties to an agreement do have concurring intentions there is consensus and 
no need to question whether one of the parties had any particular impression of the other’s 
intention.32 If there is a material mistake by one or both of the parties and therefore no actual 
consensus, the reliance theory recognizes that there is a contract “if one of the parties, in a 
reasonable manner, relied on the impression that there was consensus.”33 
1.2 MISTAKE IN CONTRACT – A BRIEF DISCUSSION34 
On the basis of the above exposition, it is evident that South African law of contract is 
characterized by a dual basis: the primary basis is the will theory and the secondary basis is the 
reliance theory. In light of the fact that the point of departure in South African contract law is the 
consensual will theory, there can only be a valid contract if the parties have reached consensus 
(subjective agreement) on the following aspects of the contract: 
 The parties to the contract; 
 The terms of the contract; and 
 The fact that the agreement is legally binding (animus contrahendi).35 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 (3) SA 978 (A).  
31 Ibid 994-996. 
32 Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 38-39. In this way the shortcomings of the 
will theory are corrected by an application of the reliance theory, more particularly in the form of the famous 
principle enunciated by Blackburn J in Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, 607: “If, whatever a man’s real 
intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms 
proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus 
conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.” 
33 Ibid. 
34 For a more detailed discussion on mistake in contract, see Hutchison (note 5 above) 81-111; Bhana, Bonthuys & 
Nortje (note 2 above) 281-315; Van Der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe (note 17 above) 25-30; IG 
Farlam & EW Hathaway A Case Book on the South African Law of Contract 2nd (1979) 65-66. 
35 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 281. 
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However, difficulties arise in circumstances where there is a difference between the parties’ 
declared agreement and their actual subjective intentions – that is, the parties appear to have 
reached agreement, but in fact one or both of them have a different subjective intention.36 Where 
a partie’s state of mind is not in accord with the facts – that is, their objective outward 
declaration is not consistent with their subjective intention - they are said to be labouring under a 
mistake. Mistake in contract refers to the situation where a contracting party acts while under an 
incorrect impression regarding some or other fact that relates to and affects the contract between 
the parties.37 The effect of the mistake depends on the type of mistake made. Our law 
distinguishes between causal and non-causal mistakes. A mistake is non-casual if the mistaken 
party would have entered into the contract on exactly the same terms even if he had not made the 
mistake, while, on the other hand, a mistake is causal if it affected the mistaken party’s decision 
to contract.38 
Where a mistake is causal and relates to one or more of the three aspects required for subjective 
consensus (the parties, the terms or the animus contrahendi), the mistake is said to be an 
essential (or ‘material’) mistake and the contract should be regarded as invalid due to the lack of 
subjective agreement between the parties.39 However, our law recognizes that it may be 
necessary to protect the non-mistaken party’s reasonable reliance on the appearance of assent – 
that is, the non-mistaken party’s belief that there is in fact consensus. 
The mistaken party will sometimes be bound to the declared agreement on the basis of policy 
considerations in that it may be unfair to the non-mistaken party to declare the contract void in 
circumstances where he or she reasonably believed that the parties had reached agreement.40 
Dale Hutchison describes the situation as follows:  
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Hutchison (note 5 above) 82. The Oxford Dictionary of Law (note 2 above) 344 defines ‘mistake’ as “a 
misunderstanding or erroneous belief about a matter of fact (mistake of fact) or a matter of law (mistake of law).” 
38 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 282-283. 
39 Ibid 283 read with 293. See also Hutchison (note 5 above) 84 where the author describes an essential mistake as a 
‘material’ or ‘operative’ mistake. The opposite of an essential mistake is a mistake in motive. Bhana, Bonthuys & 
Nortje (note 2 above) 284 describe a mistake in motive as a mistake which “only affects a party’s reasons for 
contracting. Despite the mistake, there is still subjective consensus.” 
40 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 293. 
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“A denial of contractual liability in instances where dissensus is not readily apparent to all parties 
could result in undue hardship for a party who has incurred expense in reasonable reliance on the 
existence of a contract. It could also greatly affect the reliability of contractual commitments.”41 
In such circumstances our courts employ two approaches: (1) the justus error theory, and (2) the 
‘reasonable reliance’ theory. In light of the working of the reliance theory, the non-mistaken 
party can enforce the contract despite the other party’s mistake if the following three 
requirements are satisfied: 
1. By his conduct, the mistaken party must have created the impression that there was 
subjective consensus between the parties;42 
2. The non-mistaken party must actually have relied on the impression created by the 
mistaken party’s declaration;43 and 
3. The reliance by the non-mistaken party must have been reasonable.44 
The caveat subscriptor rule, expressed in terms of the reliance theory, means that, in the absence 
of consensus, a signatory may be held bound on the basis that by signing a document containing 
contractual terms s/he led the non-mistaken party reasonably to believe that s/he (the signatory) 
has actually assented to the contract in question.45  
The reliance of the non-mistaken party will not be reasonable where: (1) the non-mistaken party 
was aware that the signatory had made a mistake; (2) where the non-mistaken party “ought 
reasonably to have known that the terms do not reflect the signatory’s true intention”;46 or (3) 
where the non-mistaken party “is in some way responsible for the fact that the signatory was not 
aware of the contents of the contract.”47 These instances in which the non-mistaken party’s 
                                                          
41 Hutchison (note 5 above) 90-91. 
42 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 293. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Pretorius (note 10 above) 663; Woker (note 10 above) 110. 
46 Sharrock (note 10 above) 78-83; Woker (note 10 above) 110; Nortje (note 11 above) 748. 
47 Ibid. The justus error approach need not be discussed in detail because, as will be shown below, the caveat 
subscriptor rule has been widely accepted as being a species of the reliance theory. However, it is important to note 
that in Sonap Petroleum (formally known as Sonarep) SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis (1992) 3 SA 234 (A) 293-240 
Harms AJA effectively recast the justus error doctrine as merely an indirect application of the reliance theory, 
implying that both approaches were mirror images of each other or the flip-side of the same coin. In terms of the 
justus error approach, the mistaken party must show that the mistake was causal, essential and justus (reasonable). In 
order to prove that the mistake was justus, the mistaken party will rely on the same three grounds as in the case of 
the reasonable reliance approach – that is, the mistaken party must show that the non-mistaken party (the contract 
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reliance will not be reasonable provide the narrow grounds upon which a signatory may escape 
the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule, and will be discussed in more detail below.48 
However, before proceeding to do so, I will briefly explain how the caveat subscriptor rule fits 
in with the preferred approach to contractual liability in cases of dissensus in the South African 
law of contract and why this is important. 
1.3 THE CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR RULE AS A SPECIES OF THE RELIANCE 
THEORY 
From a historical perspective, South African courts have, over the course of the last century, 
vacillated between subjective and objective approaches to the issue of contractual liability.49 In 
respect of the caveat subscriptor rule, the rule was adopted in 190350 and at a period when a 
consensual (subjective) approach to contractual liability had been received from Roman-Dutch 
law.51 However, objective theories were introduced later by way of English law; for instance, in 
Pieters & Co v Saloman52 the Appellate Division chose to adopt the English approach, as was 
the case in South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd.53 Indeed, 
even as late as 1958, the Appellate Division could say that our law follows a “generally objective 
approach to the creation of contracts.”54 
Innes CJ approved the following statement made by Mellish LJ in Parker v South Eastern Ry:55 
“In an ordinary case of written agreement it is wholly immaterial that the signatory has not read 
the agreement, and does not know its contents.” But the authoritative formulation of the rule in 
English law is that of Scrutton LJ in L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd,56 where the court accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enforcer) was aware, ought to have been aware or caused the mistake. For a more detailed discussion of the justus 
error approach see Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 294-297. 
48 See below, Grounds for Escaping the Strict Application of the Caveat Subscriptor Rule. 
49 C-J Pretorius ‘A Reconciliation of the Different Approaches to Contractual Liability in the Absence of Actual 
Consensus: Sonap Petroleum (formally known as Sonarep) SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis (1992) 3 SA 234 (A)’ 
(1992) 55 THRHR 668; Pretorius (note 10 above) 661; Hutchison (note 5 above) 17. 
50 Burger v Central South African Railways (note 10 above) 578. 
51 Pretorius (note 10 above) 666. 
52 Pieters & Co v Saloman 1911 AD 121. 
53 South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd (note 14 above). 
54 National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) 479. 
55 Parker v South Eastern Ry (1877) 2 CPD 416, 421, cited in Pretorius (note 10 above) 666. See also Farlam & 
Hathaway (note 34 above) 96.  
56 L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. 
19 
 
that, within certain limits, a signature on a contractual document is a conclusive reason for 
holding the party who has signed to the terms of the document.57 
It is therefore interesting to note that Innes CJ formulated the caveat subscriptor rule with 
reference to English law and not Roman-Dutch law58 – that is, the rule was introduced into our 
law as a species of the objective declaration theory. However, following a series of cases in 
which our courts made it clear that the true basis of contractual liability in our law is real 
consensus, tempered by the reliance theory, the caveat subscriptor rule was redefined in terms of 
reliance.59 
Defining the rule in terms of reliance has the advantage of fitting in neatly with the preferred 
approach to contractual liability in cases of dissensus in our law of contract, and today there is 
strong support for the notion that the reliance theory is the basis of the caveat subscriptor rule.60 
That this is the position in our law was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Constantia 
Insurance v Compusourse (Pty) Ltd61 and subsequently in Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd.62 
In Hartley the Court held that in order to decide whether the caveat subscriptor rule was 
applicable or not, the decisive question would be whether the reliance of the contract assertor on 
a contract was reasonable.63 
Christie stresses the fact that it is crucial that the contract assertor’s belief in consensus must be 
reasonable, because it is only a reasonable person that can rely on the doctrine of quasi-mutual 
assent.64 As explained above, this approach is consistent with the theory of contractual liability 
                                                          
57 Ibid 403: “When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, 
misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or 
not.” See also PS Atiyah Essays on Contract (1986) 109.  
58 Burger v Central South African Railways (note 10 above) 578-579. According to Pretorius (note 10 above) 664: 
“The rule was adopted in Burger v Central South African Railways TS 571 578 without a hint of the reliance theory 
as such and, moreover, in a manner reminiscent of classic instances of an objective approach (declaration theory).” 
59 See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman (note 30 above); Hutchison (note 5 above) 19. 
60 See Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA) 421; Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Sun Couriers (note 10 above) 601; Constantia Insurance v Compusourse (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) 354F; 
Christie (note 10 above) 175; Pretorius (note 10 above) 664; Woker (note 10 above) 110; Lewis (note 10 above) 
375; Barnard-Naude (note 10 above) 502. 
61 Constantia Insurance v Compusourse (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) 354F. 
62 Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers (note 10 above). 
63 Ibid 603. See also Barnard-Naude (note 10 above) 500-501. 
64 Christie (note 10 above) 24. See also Barnard-Naude (note 10 above) 502; Woker (note 10 above) 110. 
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endorsed in our law of contract, according to which liability ensues either on the basis of 
consensus (the will theory) or on the basis of reasonable reliance (the reliance theory).65 
1.4 GROUNDS FOR ESCAPING THE STRICT APPLICATION OF THE CAVEAT 
SUBSCRIPTOR RULE 
As explained above, the caveat subscriptor rule is not applied without exception, and there are 
certain narrow grounds recognized by the courts to date upon which one may escape the working 
of the caveat subscriptor rule. As hinted at by Innes CJ, there may be circumstances which 
provide relief for the unwitting signatory: “There are, of course, grounds upon which he may 
repudiate a document to which he has put his hand.”66 Generally though, a signatory will not 
lightly be relieved from liability under a contract to which he has appended his signature and it 
remains difficult for a signatory to escape on the basis of mistake.67 
Be that as it may, it is now firmly recognized in our law that the reliance of the non-mistaken 
party will not be reasonable in the following narrow circumstances: (1) where the non-mistaken 
party was aware that the signatory had made a mistake;68 (2) where the non-mistaken party 
“ought reasonably to have known that the terms do not reflect the signatory’s true intention”;69 or 
(3) where the non-mistaken party is “in some way responsible for the fact that the signatory was 
not aware of the contents of the contract.”70 
The non-mistaken party will be held responsible for the fact that the signatory was not aware of 
the contents of the contract where he or she misled the mistaken party as to the nature or contents 
of the contract.71 Broadly stated, this will be the case in two instances: (1) where the contractual 
                                                          
65 See footnotes 30 and 32 above and the authorities cited there. 
66 Burger v Central South African Railways (note 10 above) 578. According to Hunt (note 10 above) 461, it is 
“accepted that in certain circumstances the signer can successfully raise mistake to avoid liability. And this is clearly 
necessary: it would be bad to allow a signer to avoid liability on the merest pretext; but it would be just as bad to 
give his co-contractant the impression that by signing, the signer had given him (the co-contractant) carte blanche to 
bad faith. A via media must be found.” 
67 Pretorius (note 10 above) 661; Nortje (note 10 above) 133. 
68 Sonap Petroleum (formally known as Sonarep) SA (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis (note 47 above). 
69 See MV Navigator (No 1): Wellness International Network Ltd v MV Navigator and Another 2004 (5) SA 10 (C); 
Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 537 (W). 
70 See Home Fires Transvaal CC v Van Wyk & Another 2002 (2) SA 375 (W); African Solar (Pty) Ltd v Divwatt 
(Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 681 (SCA).  See also Sharrock (note 10 above) 78-83; Woker (note 10 above) 110; Nortje 
(note 11 above) 748. 
71 Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 307; Sharrock (note 10 above) 81. 
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document is misleading in itself;72 or (2) where the contractual document contains unexpected or 
unusual terms.73 In these cases our courts have recognized a duty to speak on the part of the 
proferens, and a failure to disclose the relevant unexpected terms in breach of such duty will 
constitute a misrepresentation (which may allow the signatory to escape liability under the iustus 
error doctrine). 
To date, our courts have recognized that a contractual document may contain unexpected or 
unusual terms in the following circumstances: (1) where the written contract is inconsistent with 
your advertisement that had attracted the signatory to do business with you;74 (2) where 
representations during negotiations are inconsistent with the terms of the contract to be signed;75 
or (3) because of the nature of the contract or the surrounding circumstances of the case – that is, 
by including an important clause in a document which, by its heading or nature, could not be 
expected to contain such a clause, printing an important clause in small print, or by tucking it 
away where it is not obvious.76 
While it could be argued that our courts have detracted from a consistently strict application of 
the caveat subscriptor rule by recognizing and developing certain exceptions, these exceptions 
are clearly recognized in the interests of fairness to the parties (and, especially, the signatory). In 
this light it is submitted that our courts must be wary of judicial idleness by preventing the 
unwitting signatory from escaping an unread contract where the circumstances do not fall neatly 
into one of the recognized categories of exceptions. As will be shown below, signatories often 
enter into unread contracts for various reasons – reasons which, strictly speaking, may not satisfy 
any of the currently recognized grounds for escaping an unread contract. The pragmatic reality of 
‘unreadness’ is widely recognized. However, good or bad as this reality might be, contract law 
often stubbornly refuses to come to grips with it, and South African contract law is no exception. 
Extensive literature in psychology and behavioural economics reveal that most consumers do not 
act as “rational economic agents”. Consumers often resort to the use of heuristics (short cuts) 
                                                          
72 See Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd (note 60 above). 
73 See Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency 1921 TPD 62; Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors 1985 2 SA 893 (A); 
Spindrifter v Lester Donovan 1986 1 SA 303 (A); Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors 1994 (2) SA 518 (C); Fourie v 
Hansen 2001 (2) SA 823 (W); Bhana, Bonthuys & Nortje (note 2 above) 308-309; Sharrock (note 10 above) 80-81. 
74 See Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency; Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors supra. 
75 See Spindrifter v Lester Donovan (note 73 above). 
76 See Fourie v Hansen (note 73 above); Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors (note 73 above); Christie (note 10 above) 178. 
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when entering into contracts and can suffer when complex contracts take advantage of the short 
cuts they take. This problem is exacerbated by the wide use of standard-form contracts: Firms 
that use standard-form contracts usually acquire the services of a legal advisor to draft the terms 
and conditions of the document and consequently the draftsman is thus concerned with 
incorporating all the terms that are beneficial to the firm – usually to the disadvantage of the 
consumer. 
Fortunately, during the last half-century and more, the consumer revolution has expanded and 
has been embraced in numerous legal systems, including our own. While South African law has 
previously had elements of consumer law, the promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act, 
200877 is a major advance, surpassing both in scope and focus the legal framework that it 
replaces as the legislature has not only provided a structure for consumer protection but has also, 
more significantly, invited the courts to participate in extending and developing this structure.78 
The growth and development of consumer law locally and internationally has exhibited a number 
of distinct features, including a growing appreciation of the implications and consequences of the 
doctrine of unchecked freedom of contract as well as the fact that the exploitation of weaknesses 
in the legal system to the detriment of consumers, which is in conflict with civilised norms and 
values, can no longer be tolerated.79 As such, the Act represents a comprehensive piece of 
legislation containing a number of requirements for consumer agreements as well as substantial 
consumer protection measures. This legislation follows the introduction of the National Credit 
Act, 200580 which also promotes extensive consumer protection and which has been in full effect 
since 1 June 2007.81 The potential impact of the Consumer Protection Act in the context of the 
common law caveat subscriptor rule warrants closer examination. 
 
                                                          
77 Act 68 of 2008. 
78 See Van Eeden (note 10 above) 2: “[South African] courts are unfairly reproached, both for their lack of zeal in 
rewriting the common law, and for their restraint in not rushing in where the legislature fears to tread…courts have 
now been granted not only the mandate for changing the common law (which they had previously indicated that 
they lacked); they have also been entrusted with a commission to execute this task.” 
79 Ibid 3-4. 
80 Act 34 of 2005. 
81 TA Woker ‘Error! Main Document Only.Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation? A Look at Some 
of the Reasons Behind the Introduction of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31 











2.1 THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - A POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE LEVELING 
OF THE PLAYING FIELDS 
The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 200882 was signed into law on 24 April 2009. It was brought 
into operation incrementally; most of the provisions took effect in October 2010, while the Act 
came into full force and effect on 1 April 2011.83 Consumer protection is essential in every 
market, particularly in the South African context. The more vulnerable consumers, the more 
protection is required. The Consumer Protection Act is the culmination of several decades of 
debate and legal development in the field of consumer protection in South Africa, largely on the 
part of government, the national and provincial legislatures and many academics.84 
                                                          
82 The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (cited hereafter as the Consumer Protection Act or the Act). For a 
comprehensive understanding and in depth analysis of the Consumer Protection Act, see E Van Eeden A Guide to 
the Consumer Protection Act 1st Ed (2009). 
83 Consumer Protection Act, see Schedule 2 ‘Transitional Provisions’, Item 2 ‘Incremental Effect of the Act’. 
84 In 1970 the Co-ordinating Consumer Council was established under government auspices. The Trade Practices 
Act 76 of 1976 was enacted in 1976, and the Unfair Business Practices (Consumer Affairs) Act 71 of 1988 
(replicated in several provinces since 1996) followed in 1988. The Fifth and Final Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts (the Hoexter Report) appeared in 1983. The Small Claims 
Court Act 61 of 1984 was enacted in 1984, and, in 1992, Report No 15 of the Business Practices Committee 
(“Consumer Codes”) foreshadowed some of the innovations that have been embodied in the Consumer Protection 
Act. The Report of Project 47 of the South African Law Commission, relating to Unreasonable Stipulations in 
Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts, was released in 1998. See D McQuoid-Mason, T Woker, L 
Greenbaum, I Konyn, C Lakhani, T Cohen Consumer Law in South Africa 1st Ed (1997) 327 and Van Eeden (note 
82 above) 23. 
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The Act acknowledges the reality of many South African consumers: “High levels of poverty, 
illiteracy and other forms of social and economic inequality; living in remote or low-density 
population areas; being minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable consumers; and having a 
limited ability to read and comprehend advertisements, agreements, instructions and warnings as 
a result of low literacy levels, vision impairment or language impediments.”85 The Act also refers 
to the need to “fulfil the rights of historically disadvantaged persons and to promote their full 
participation as consumers.”86 
While the Act does impose some duties on suppliers to ensure that consumers are aware of and 
understand the terms of the contracts that they conclude, these duties are not absolute as a certain 
degree of vigilance is still expected from the signatory.87 This is an appropriate approach to the 
issue. However, in light of the modern realities surrounding consumer non-readership 
,particularly in the context of contracts of necessity (which will be discussed in more detail in 
section IV), it is submitted that the signatory should not be overburdened in this regard and that 
absolute vigilance on the part of the signatory should not be expected. To expect absolute 
vigilance on the part of the signatory would be to turn a blind eye to the fact that “consumers 
cannot understand and do not actually assent to the terms of the consumer contracts they sign.”88 
In relation to the application of the caveat subscriptor rule section 22 and section 49 of the Act 
are worth highlighting. As in the case with other consumer protection legislation such as the 
National Credit Act,89 section 22 of the Consumer Protection Act imposes a duty on suppliers to 
ensure that all documents are drawn up in plain language and in a format which would be 
understood by a consumer with “average literacy skills and minimal experience” without undue 
effort.90 In terms of section 49 exclusion (or exemption) clauses must be drawn to the attention 
                                                          
85 Consumer Protection Act, Preamble. See also Maria Davey ‘A Summary of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008’ available at http://www.meumannwhite.co.za/news-details/25/, accessed on 24 November 2012. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Nortje (note 10 above) 145. 
88 AM White & CL Mansfield ‘Literacy and Contract’ Stanford Law & Policy Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, 233 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008484, accessed on 24 November 2012. 
89 The National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
90 Consumer Protection Act, S 22 Right to information in plain and understandable language: 
(1) The producer of a notice, document or visual representation that is required, in terms of this Act or any other 
law, to be produced, provided or displayed to a consumer must produce, provide or display that notice, document or 
visual representation - 
(a) in the form prescribed in terms of this Act or any other legislation, if any, for that notice, document or visual 
representation; or  
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of the consumer in a conspicuous manner which is likely to be noticed by an ‘ordinarily alert’ 
consumer, with heightened duties placed on the supplier when the clause involves an unusual or 
serious risk.91 Exemption clauses have traditionally taken center stage in cases where the caveat 
subscriptor rule has been applied and are often the real issue in terms of liability for the 
inattentive signatory.92 Accordingly, this last provision may in itself go some way towards 
tempering the sometimes harsh consequences of application of the caveat rule in the context of 
such clauses (in consumer contracts). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(b) in plain language, if no form has been prescribed for that notice, document or visual representation. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a notice, document or visual representation is in plain language if it is reasonable to 
conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, document or visual representation is 
intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of the relevant goods or services, could 
be expected to understand the content, significance and import of the notice, document or visual representation 
without undue effort, having regard to -  
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, document or visual representation; 
(b) the organisation, form and style of the notice, document or visual representation; 
(c) the vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the notice, document or visual representation; and 
(d) the use of any illustrations, examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding. 
91 Consumer Protection Act, S 49 Notice required for certain terms and conditions: 
(1) Any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that purports to- 
(a) limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person; 
(b) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer; 
(c) impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any cause; or 
(d) be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer, must be drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner 
and form that satisfies the formal requirements of subsections (3) to (5). 
(2) In addition to subsection (1), if a provision or notice concerns any activity or 
facility that is subject to any risk- 
(a) of an unusual character or nature; 
(b) the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware or notice, or which an 
ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to notice or contemplate in the circumstances; or 
(c) that could result in serious injury or death,  
the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to the attention of the consumer in 
a manner and form that satisfies the requirements of subsections (3) to (5), and the consumer must have assented to 
that provision or notice by signing or initialing the provision or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision. 
(3) A provision, condition or notice contemplated in subsection (1) or (2) must be written in plain language, as 
described in section 22. 
(4) The fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice contemplated in subsection (1) must be drawn to the 
attention of the consumer - 
(a) in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer, having 
regard to the circumstances; and 
(b) before the earlier of the time at which the consumer - 
(i) enters into the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in the activity, or enters or gains access to the facility; 
or 
(ii) is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or agreement. 
(5) The consumer must be given an adequate opportunity in the circumstances to receive and comprehend the 
provision or notice as contemplated in subsection (1). 
92 See for example Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), or the more recent judgment of Hartley 
v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers (note 10 above). 
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Undoubtedly, conscientious observance of this section of the Act by suppliers will go a long way 
towards making consumers aware of the risks attendant upon entering into agreements 
containing exemption clauses, but, viewed from the perspective of contractual mistake, the Act 
may in fact have a less than favourable impact.93 Where a supplier has taken active steps to bring 
a provision to the consumer’s attention, such consumer would have a hard time pleading 
ignorance of the provision (iustus error) under the traditional exceptions to the caveat rule. In 
some cases, increased transparency will be to the consumer’s benefit, while in other cases the 
relative bargaining positions of the parties may be such that added transparency will be of little 
value to the consumer.94 
Providers of services are notoriously lax in pointing out exemption clauses hidden away in 
standard-form contracts and this has often provided our courts with a weapon, empowering them 
to refuse enforcement of such clauses by implying a duty to point out the clause to the other 
party in the circumstances.95 Understood in terms of operative error, a failure to point out such a 
clause translates into reasonable mistake on the part of the unwitting signatory, or conversely, the 
failure of reasonable reliance on the part of the contract enforcer.96 Compelled by the Act to 
point out exemption clauses, providers of goods and services will probably take precautions to 
do so and thereby nullify a useful common law tool which our courts have at times been 
prepared to wield for the benefit of the contract denier (often an unwitting signatory).97 
An important point to bear in mind at this stage, especially in light of the widespread illiteracy 
among South African consumers and the generally poor levels of education, is the fact that 
whether consumers read contracts or not is irrelevant if such contracts are difficult to 
understand.98 According to White and Mansfield, “consumer disclosures retain their appeal for 
lawmakers despite the growing realization that they do not necessarily work…however well 
                                                          
93 C-J Pretorius ‘Exemption Clauses and Mistake, Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 SA 572 (SCA)’ (2010) 73 
THRHR 491, 500. 
94 Van Eeden (note 82 above) 76. 
95 Pretorius (note 93 above) 500. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See Thalia Randall ‘Low-fee schools on the rise’ Mail & Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-
07-low-fee-schools-on-the-rise accessed on 24 November 2012: “The minority of South Africans are being schooled 
at fantastic private schools and former model C government schools. The rest are being educated in the disaster of 
our education system…Our education system is ranked lower than poorer countries in Africa and the world…ranked 
133 out of 142 countries for "quality of the educational system" in the 2011-2012 World Competitiveness Report 
released by the World Economic Forum.” 
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designed, [disclosure statutes] may not be able to aid most consumers in understanding the terms 
of their agreements.”99 Nevertheless, judges and legislators continue to assume that consumers 
have the ability to read and understand, and do in fact read and understand, consumer contracts 
entered into – contracts which, in most cases, are entered into out of necessity. Even more 
worrying perhaps is the fact that “while many contract law scholars extol the virtue of disclosure 
statutes as a way to address unequal bargaining power”,100 the experiences in foreign 
jurisdictions suggests that disclosure requirements are often ineffective at best, and at worst 
aggravate the problem.101 More will be said later on the relationship between the strict 
application of the caveat subscriptor rule in the context of contracts of necessity and the 
constitutional value of equality, as well as the ability of consumers to correctly assess, and act 
on, information after having read the everyday consumer contracts they enter into or after having 
had terms brought to their attention. 
The South African education system is currently in a poor state and poverty is rife in our society. 
Consequently, the greatest sufferers, the poor, those most desperate to acquire goods and services 
and those least able to bargain over, or even understand, the terms on which they contracted, may 
actually experience further hardships due to the workings of certain provisions of the Act. 
Recently labour unrest has swept through South Africa’s mining sector. While mining bosses 
calculate their multi-million rand Christmas bonuses, the poor and “financially illiterate” miners 
are being systematically abused by money lenders and collection attorneys. One of South 
Africa’s debt consultants commented on the situation as follows: “[M]ost of [the miners] can’t 
read or write, they don’t know what they are signing for (when entering into debt agreements and 
authorising garnishee orders) … automatically the system is exploiting them.”102 
The head of a homeless family may sign a lease which gives the landlord the right to raise the 
rent unilaterally and at will, or a consumer from a rural area may purchase furniture only to find 
out later that he has waived all his rights relating to latent defects in the goods sold. Ironically, in 
                                                          
99 White & Mansfield (note 88 above) 262. 
100 DK Hart ‘Contract Law Now – Reality Meets Legal Fictions’ University of Baltimore Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 
1, 2011, 35-36 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682902, accessed on 24 November 
2012. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Malcolm Rees ‘Financially illiterate miners debt shocker’ Moneyweb available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-special-investigations/financially-illiterate-miners-debt-shocker-fraud-a, 
accessed on 24 November 2012. 
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circumstances such as these, if the service provider or suppler complied with the sec. 49 
notification requirements of the Consumer Protection Act, the courts will have less room in 
which to maneuver when adjudicating along the lines of justifiable mistake, because if such a 
clause has in fact been pointed out to the consumer and it falls within legal limits, the consumer 
may not have a leg to stand on.103 
The introduction and implementation of the Consumer Protection Act is most certainly 
welcomed. This new legislative leveling of the playing-field between consumers and suppliers 
was required by our Constitution,104 which envisages a fair, caring and humane society, in which 
everybody counts and the dignity of everyone is respected. Unfortunately, however, the Act does 
not adequately address the fundamental problems in relation to the common law principle of 
caveat subscriptor, which are still very much alive. 
While the Consumer Protection Act and similar legislation is one way of addressing the 
shortcomings inherent within a strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule (by, for example, 
introducing transparency and notification requirements in terms of sections 22 and 49 
respectively), it is submitted that, in keeping with the legislature’s invitation to the courts to 
participate in extending and developing the consumer protection structure, it is more suitable to 
examine the common law basis and nature of the caveat subscriptor rule and to consider the 
suitability and extent of its continued application, especially in light of modern consumer 
interactions. Such an approach would be perfectly compatible with the rationale behind section 
39(2) of the Bill of Rights – that the common law be developed so as to be made compliant with 
the values that underlie the Constitution.105 
I will proceed to focus on the potential role of the courts and the common law in respect of 
suggested development of the application of the caveat rule. I will begin by critically examining 
the underlying presumptions (or precepts) of the caveat subscriptor rule which purport to justify 
the existence and application of the rule itself. This will provide a basis for attempting to 
illustrate that the underlying assumptions as well as the reasons why society originally demanded 
                                                          
103 Pretorius (note 93 above) 502.  
104 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
105 In terms of section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution, when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. 
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– and still demands – that the rule be applied has withered with time and is now out of step with 
the modern reality – that is, the once uncompromising cornerstone of our law of contract that is 
the caveat subscriptor rule has lost much of its relevance when contrasted with the more 






3.1 A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE - DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE 
ACTUAL BASIS AND THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CAVEAT 
SUBSCRIPTOR RULE 
In ‘The Substance and Form in the Law of Contract’, Alfred Cockrell draws a distinction 
between the authority of the state to enforce contracts and two underlying assumptions of 
contracts in general: firstly, that a contract is a promise and, secondly, that a promise creates a 
moral obligation to perform.106 The author then goes on to suggest that these underlying 
premises are what justify the conclusion that contracts should be enforced by the law.107 
Just as one can draw a distinction between the enforceability of contracts and  the assumptions 
that underlie contractual liability, similarly one can draw a distinction between the actual basis 
and the underlying assumptions (or precepts) of the caveat subscriptor rule. As explained above, 
the rule has been discussed at length in various contract law textbooks and by numerous 
academic writers.108 However, to date, the distinction between the actual basis and the 
underlying assumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule, as well as their interaction with each 
other, have received little (if any) attention. 
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By and large, standard form terms form part of the enforceable agreement in consumer contracts, 
even though, as will be shown below in section IV, it is recognized that they are almost never 
read. The issue that arises is how, then, can it be said that by simply appending ones signature to 
a document that one has created the appearance or reasonable reliance of having assented to such 
terms of the contract? According to Ben-Shahar: 
“Contract law [has] developed traditions that resolve this paradox through presumptions. One 
such presumption underlies the ‘duty to read.’ True, people do not read contracts, but they can be 
presumed to read. This is a fairly strong presumption…The duty to read encompasses the duty to 
ask someone to read or to explain the terms. This presumption, of course, is not based on 
generalized empirical regularity. Rather, it is a method to shift the burden of information 
acquisition to the passive party.”109 
As evidenced by the discussion above, the caveat subscriptor rule is a species of the reliance 
theory. Therefore the actual basis of the rule is concerned with a theory of contractual liability. 
However, it is the underlying assumptions or general precepts which inform, shape and 
legitimize the actual basis of the rule – that is, the underlying assumptions are what legitimize 
the reliance of the contract enforcer and render the reliance reasonable.110 These underlying 
assumptions or precepts of the caveat subscriptor rule may be described as follows: 
1. The law expects the signatory to ascertain the terms of a contract before signature;111 
2. The signatory had read the contract with due care prior to signature;112 
3. The signatory had an adequate opportunity to read the contract;113 
4. The signatory understands the terms and appreciates their import and is aware of the 
consequences of signing;114 
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5. The deliberate decision to not ascertain the terms of a contractual document prior to 
signature is assumed to imply blanket consent to all the terms contained in it;115 and 
6. The party who signs a contractual document without reading it assumes the risk of 
disagreement between the parties.116 
These six general assumptions117 underlying the caveat subscriptor rule are superimposed by and 
wedded into the assumptions underlying the classical liberal theory of contract which still 
informs the South African law of contract, regardless of the fact that social and political values 
and conditions have changed.118 Simply put, the classical model of contract is based on the 
assumption that contracting parties generally possess a real freedom of choice whether, with 
whom and on what terms to contract.119 This assumption in turn is based on a number of other 
assumptions, such as that: 
 The parties enjoy more or less equal bargaining power;  
 There is perfect, or near-perfect, competition in the market; and  
 The parties actually negotiate the terms of their contract.120 
It is now widely recognized that in many everyday situations these assumptions are simply not 
accurate and, as Woolman quite rightly points out, “the Supreme Court of Appeal’s classically 
liberal approach to the law of contract reinforces the poverty and powerlessness of many South 
Africans”,121 as the common law “relies upon the fiction that our private law provides a neutral 
background for agreements, contractual or otherwise, between fully autonomous individuals.”122 
The underlying assumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule have, like the underlying assumptions 
of our general law of contract and the classical liberal theory, over time become accepted as 
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axiomatic truths. However, while the assumptions underlying the caveat subscriptor rule may 
have been accurate and relevant in the past, societal change and other factors appear to have 
overtaken them and thus their continued application in bolstering the adherence to the rule is, to 
say the least, questionable and deserving of closer critical examination. In order to critically 
evaluate the continued application of the caveat subscriptor rule, one needs to consider some 
more fundamental aspects of the development of contract law more generally, including the way 
in which the conclusion of contracts have evolved from actual to imputed consensus. The 
introduction of standard-form contracts and their widespread use in modern consumer 
transactions is probably the single most important factor which undermines the underlying 
assumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule. It is submitted that the ‘veiling effect’ of standard-
form contracts, particularly in circumstances of consumer necessity, has resulted in the continued 
support for the underlying assumptions in such circumstances of necessity to constitute dubious 
law. 
3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW AND THE CHANGING JUDICIAL 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
SIGNATORY AND THE CONTRACT-ENFORCER 
As alluded to above, the classical liberal theory of contract underlying our common law of 
contract appears to implicitly assume an arm’s length style of bargaining and contract-making 
between parties of approximately equivalent bargaining strength, negotiating the terms of their 
contract clause by clause, with such clauses eventually being recorded in written form to reflect 
the agreement that has been reached between the parties after strenuous negotiation.123 However, 
the style of contracting on the basis of a pre-printed (and often non-negotiable) form presented 
by the one party to the other, often under some form of time-duress, is a phenomenon of the 
modern age preceded by the development of the classical liberal theory of contract.124 
Consequently, in the 21st century, the classical model represents a rather idealistic and unrealistic 
picture of contract as experienced by ordinary people. Circumstances have changed quite 
                                                          




dramatically over the course of the last century, calling into question some of the most basic 
tenets of contract law and generating pressures for reform.125 
Since the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the bargaining positions 
between individuals and corporations have become very unequal.126 If you want to test the 
correctness of this statement, try crossing out and initialing some of the clauses in the next 
standard form contract that you are asked to sign.127 You will no doubt be given a fresh, 
unaltered contract and firmly told to start again.128 
According to Sachs J, standard-form contracts are, essentially, “contracts that are drafted in 
advance by the supplier of goods or services and presented to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, thus eliminating opportunity for arm's length negotiations. They contain a common stock 
of contract terms that tend to be weighted heavily in favour of the supplier and to operate to limit 
or exclude the consumer's normal contractual rights and the supplier's normal contractual 
obligations and liabilities.”129 
I need not expand on the extensive use in modern times of standard-form contracts which are 
drawn up by one party and merely presented for signature to the other. In the words of Atiyah, 
“this phenomenon has been much written about and is now widely acknowledged to involve 
substantial derogations from the consensual model of contract. Frequently one party has little 
effective choice in the matter at all, and neither reads nor understands, nor in any real sense 
agrees to the terms contained in such standard documents.”130 
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Consequently, standard-form contracts, with their standardized provisions, are often described by 
French scholars as contrats d’ adhesion.131 Rakoff has identified seven characteristics that define 
a model contract of adhesion: (1) The document consists of a printed form purporting to be a 
contract and containing many terms and conditions; (2) the document has been drafted by or on 
behalf of one of the parties to the transaction; (3) the document is presented to the adhering party 
with the representation (express or implied) that few, if any, of the terms will be open to 
negotiation, and that the drafting party is only willing to transact on those terms; (4) the 
document is signed by the adhering party; (5) the drafting party routinely participates in many 
transactions of the type in issue; (6) the adhering party enters few such transactions (relative at 
least to the drafting party); and (7) the main obligation that the adhering party incurs takes the 
form of the payment of money.132 
The relationship between the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule, standard-form 
consumer contracts and the manner in which the enforcement of standard-form contracts may be 
viewed as the enforcement of ‘private legislation’ will be discussed in more detail in section V. 
In what follows I will briefly examine how our courts have, in my opinion, provided indications 
of a possible change in attitude towards the underlying assumptions of the caveat subscriptor 
rule and the respective responsibilities of the signatory and the contract-enforcer in light of the 
realities surrounding modern consumer transactions characterized by the extensive employment 
of standard-from contracts. The assumptions of reading and of blanket consent, which were once 
regarded as axiomatic, have become controversial following several recent judgments.133 
In Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lotter134 the court held as follows: “I do not think that the 
plaintiff has established, and the onus is on it to do so, that the defendant was aware of the fact 
                                                          
131 K Hopkins ‘Standard-Form Contracts and the Evolving Idea of Private Law Justice: A Case of Democratic 
Capitalist Justice versus Natural Justice’ (2003) 1 J. S. Afr. L. 150, 153. See also, S Deutch Unfair Contracts (1977) 
2: “The term contracts of adhesion was first mentioned in an American article [The Delivery of a Life Insurance 
Policy (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222] where Patterson borrowed it from a civil law scholar and applied it to 
life insurance contracts. He stated: “The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely ‘adheres’ to 
it, has little choice as to its terms”. The term originated with French scholar Raymond Saleilles, who invented the 
term adhesion contracts as a method for deviating from individual interpretation. Since “a single will is exclusively 
predominant” in these circumstances, an adhesion contract should be interpreted in a similar way to legislation, not 
as a contract.” See further the discussion below on the manner in which the enforcement of standard-form contracts 
may be regarded as the enforcement of ‘private legislation’. 
132 TD Rakoff ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1173, 1177. 
133 Nortje (note 10 above) 136. 
134 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lotter 1989 (1) SA 585 (C). 
35 
 
that by signing the document he had undertaken a personal suretyship obligation.”135 In effect 
therefore, the court held that the contract assertor bore the onus of convincing the court that the 
signatory was aware of the terms of the signed document.136 In Sun Couriers v Kimberley 
Diamond Wholesalers137 the court expressly stated: “It is common knowledge that people sign 
documents without reading them.”138 
Four years on, the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Brink v Humphries & 
Jewell (Pty) Ltd.139 Here the majority appeared to completely negate any responsibility on the 
signatory to ascertain the terms of the document that he or she is signing, apart from a cursory 
examination of the heading and the clauses in which blank spaces have to be filled in. According 
to Bhana and Nortje, the implication of the majority judgment in Brink v Humphries is that the 
non-mistaken party (and the law) can no longer legitimately expect the signatory to read an 
obviously contractual document before signing it.140 
The judgment in Mercurius Motors v Lopez141 was once again premised on a less than rigorous 
examination of the contractual document by the signatory, since the court found that the 
document was misleading because the disputed term had not been given sufficient prominence. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in a clear and welcomed change of direction, held that an 
exemption clause excluding the liability for negligence of a motor vehicle dealer entrusted with a 
motor vehicle for the purposes of maintenance work, “should be clearly and pertinently brought 
to the attention of a customer who signs a standard instruction form, and not by way of an 
inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the reverse side of the 
page in question.”142 
While some decisions are still reconcilable with the traditional approach in relation to a 
requirement of reading as the norm,143 the implications of the judgments mentioned above is that 
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the signatory is no longer expected to ensure that he or she is conversant with the terms of the 
contract prior to signature. Some decisions either expressly, as in the case of Keens Group,144 or 
by implication, as in the case of Brink,145 reject the traditional presumption that signature 
indicates awareness by the signatory.146 The implication of these judgments is that it is no longer 
reasonable for the contract enforcer to assume that a signatory is conversant with the contents of 
a document – at most the contract enforcer can assume awareness of terms that a cursory reading 
would reveal.147 
As explained above, these judgments only illustrate what is in my opinion a possible change in 
attitude towards the underlying assumptions of the caveat subscriptor rule and the respective 
responsibilities of the signatory and the contract-enforcer. South African courts have for decades 
adopted the attitude that a person who signs a contractual document does so at his own peril and 
that no relief will be granted to him where he has signed recklessly, without first having read the 
terms of the contract.148 It is submitted that the judgments discussed above offer indications of a 
possible re-think in respect of the traditional roles and responsibilities of the signatory and the 
contract-enforcer and, more importantly, indicate that the balance of fairness should be swinging 
in favour of the signatory rather than the traditional emphasis on fairness towards the proferens. 
Of course it could be argued that these cases merely serve as examples of the application of the 
traditionally recognized exceptions to the caveat subscriptor rule relating to misleading 
documents or unexpected terms. As explained above, our courts have already recognized that use 
of unexpected terms in a document constitutes a form of misrepresentation. In light of this I will 
suggest later some practical methods in which this area of the common law may be developed to 
provide greater leeway for the signatory. However, for the present purpose, it cannot be gainsaid 
that these judgments do, at the very least, offer glimpses of recognition that the underlying 
assumptions in respect of reading as the norm cannot be accepted without question and that our 
courts are, to some extent, becoming more aware of the reality of consumer non-readership and, 
more importantly, are prepared to take creative judicial steps to ensure increased fairness towards 
the unwitting signatory. In section IV that follows I will discuss in detail the reality of consumer 
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non-readership, particularly in the context of contracts of necessity, in order to demonstrate that a 
shift in fairness towards the signatory is most welcome in light of the modern realities involved 
in consumer transactions. Thereafter in section V I will illustrate that increased fairness towards 
the unwitting signatory in the context of contracts of necessity is not only required in light of the 
various psychological factors and behavioural biases at play during the time of contracting 
(which will be discussed in section IV), but is also warranted in terms of our courts constitutional 
mandate to develop the common law in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 





4.1 THE REALITY OF CONSUMER NON-READERSHIP AND THE PROBLEM OF 
ILLITERACY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Traditional economic models of perfectly competitive markets depend on assumptions that 
individuals, and, in particular, consumers, possess perfect information and make optimal choices 
about whether and what to purchase.149 These classical economic models function on the 
assumption that consumers rationally maximize utility, “prefer certainty to uncertainty and value 
outcomes absolutely, rather than relative to a reference point.”150 According to Hart: 
“A basic version of the rational actor looks like this: A person acts rationally where she perfectly 
processes available information about alternative courses of action and then ranks the possible 
outcomes in the order of expected utility. Expected utility is usually defined in terms of the 
person’s “self-interest”. “Self- interest,” in turn, is commonly assumed to be wealth-
maximization. So, modern contract law’s rational actor will end up ranking all of the possible 
outcomes, based on all the information provided her, in the order in which they maximize her 
wealth. To be a rational actor therefore presupposes that one will not only have access to the 
information relevant to one’s decision but will also be able to understand it and make effective 
                                                          




use of it. Unfortunately, none of this is true in general and not when it comes, more particularly, 
to contracts.”151 
It goes without saying that most modern consumers behave differently to 'rational economic 
agents'. Extensive works in psychology and behavioural economics reveals that consumers 
“often have conflicting or non-economic objectives, or may be subject to systematic biases, 
short-cuts or errors, particularly when decisions are complex or made in circumstances that 
influence, distract or pressure.”152 At the time of contracting, consumers make what they believe 
is the wisest and most suitable decision based on the information and computational capacity 
available.153 However, that “might not be the same decision they would have made with perfect 
information and perfect rationality.”154 Aronstam, in attempting to describe what would be the 
wholly rational or quintessential consumer in the context of neo-classical economics, comments 
as follows: 
“The wholly rational consumer would have a complete grasp of household budgeting and the 
need to make provision for any contingencies. He would be aware of the range of goods and 
services available to him and be able to move outside his own neighborhood when shopping so as 
to have a wide area of choice. When contemplating the purchase of goods or services, he would 
be able to assess their qualities, both in terms of their suitability for their intended use and in 
terms of value for money. Before he signed a contract to acquire goods or services on credit, he 
would familiarize himself with its nature and terms, calculate the effective cost and consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives. When deciding whether the 
commitment was one he could afford – particularly in the case of an expensive item such as a 
motor vehicle – he would take account of the cost of maintaining, licensing and insuring the 
goods. He would also have an understanding of his legal rights and obligations when entering into 
a contract and of the steps he should take, and of the advisory facilities open to him, if he got into 
difficulties and found himself unable to perform his obligations.”155 
However, in reality, consumers have limited processing power and “use simplifying rules of 
thumb ('heuristics') to deal with situations where there is too much information to evaluate or 
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choice overload.”156 For instance, consumers may choose to adhere to default options because 
doing so simplifies their decision making and consumers often consider “only a limited number 
of variables, such as the headline price, when comparing products.”157 And while the Consumer 
Protection Act has introduced transparency and notification requirements in terms of sections 22 
and 49 respectively, the harmful effects on consumers can be aggravated if contracts contain 
immaterial or condensed terms and conditions that puzzle consumers or hides information which 
is most significant to them.158 According to two separate academic studies undertaken at the 
University of New York (NYU), almost nobody reads consumer contracts before signing (95.6% 
of participants considered the contract for an average of two seconds and then gladly signed) and 
perhaps even more surprisingly the study also revealed that “legal jargon, print density and font 
size are not key factors in consumers' decisions on whether to read their contracts.”159 
PJ Sutherland appropriately asserts that “perhaps the reasonable man of the nineteenth century 
would have thought it sensible to read and make sense of all the terms of the contracts that he 
concluded. Yet, the lifestyle of the reasonable person of the 21st century is far too complex and 
full for that.”160 
“In the modern era, we are all slaves to the form, both official and commercial. When the use of 
standard form contracts is coupled with a disparity of bargaining power favouring the one party, 
this may render it even more difficult for the weaker party to resist the imposition of a standard 
form contract. Standard form contracts have a ‘veiling effect’, the consequence of which is that 
standard terms are accepted unseen, unread and often without any understanding of the 
implications thereof by the signing party. Psychological factors also play a role: the mere fact 
that a party is confronted by a printed form creates the impression of impartiality, officialdom 
and immutability. ‘Negotiation’ often takes place with a representative who lacks the authority to 
change standard terms. Indeed, standard form contracts are seldom deviated from, as consumers 
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generally do not have the specialized knowledge to dispute the terms and conditions or haggle 
about their amendment.”161 
Behavioural economics, now a very large sub-discipline in economics, has become an influential 
source for policymaking in consumer law and policy and challenges three aspects of neo-
classical economics: unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower and unbounded self-
interest.162 The main contention of behavioural research is that many of the basic assumptions in 
standard economic models are not based on how people actually make economic decisions, and 
that they therefore lead to a descriptively worse theory than one based on more behaviorally 
correct assumptions.163 An in-depth analysis into the field of behavioural economics is beyond 
the scope of this paper and in what follows I provide merely a summary of certain well 
established findings in the literature which may play a vital role in shedding light on how our 
courts should interpret and apply the caveat subscriptor rule in the future, and which goes hand 
in hand with an insightful publication released in February 2011 by the UK Office of Fair 
Trading (the OFT) in relation to various aspects of consumer contracts and consumer 
behavioural biases. 
Consumers rarely read entire contracts before purchase and are subject to wide-ranging 
influences and biases when evaluating contracts, as revealed in the literature on behavioural 
economics and reflected in the OFT research findings. According to the OFT research findings 
the tendency not to read contracts in full arises despite the fact that 79 percent of consumers 
surveyed acknowledged that they were provided with sufficient time to read the contract.164 The 
key reason provided by consumers was that the contract terms were 'standard' which, according 
to the OFT, means that “consumers think they are protected by the law, trust the company or 
think the contract is industry standard” and thus cannot go elsewhere or do anything about the 
contract.165 
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According to the OFT findings many consumers feel that consumer contracts contains no useful 
information which is reflected in their propensity to simplify their decision-making by 
overlooking certain pieces of information. Other factors which deter reading of consumer 
contracts can be practical or psychological: “The document itself can raise the costs of reading if 
it is long, in small print, uses complex language, has a poor structure, or is on low quality 
paper.”166  
“There can also be social pressure not to scrutinize contracts, for example, because of others 
queuing. Shoppers may feel reading a contract will be seen as an expression of distrust, or as a 
failure to conform and cooperate, with physical proximity to the seller strengthening the effect. 
Furthermore, after negotiations with salespeople, consumers can feel obliged to co-operate and 
conclude the transaction.”167 
According to Ben-Shahar, “[s]pending effort to read and to process what’s in the contract 
boilerplate would be one of the more striking examples of consumer irrationality and obsessive 
behavior”:168 
“Most consumers…routinely enter into contracts in an atmosphere that discourages them from 
reading the contract to be signed and, in any event, precludes negotiation of the terms of the 
writing…A consumer who actually did read each written contract associated with each consumer 
transaction entered into would be made by social construction to feel, and would likely be thought 
of as, paranoid…In many negotiation situations all of the pressures push for friendly gestures 
rather than a suspicious line-by-line analysis of the writing.”169 
Even where consumers have read the contract or had certain terms and conditions brought to 
their attention they may still not properly assess, and act on, that information. The actuarial 
knowledge required to make an intelligent and rational decision in determining whether the 
content of the contract is good or bad is mind-boggling.170 Consequently, even if each specific 
term could be explained simply, consumers would not know what to do with the information and 
“may make errors in understanding the contract or its implication, or in the actions they take as a 
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result”.171 This could be as a result of consumer behavioural biases that affect decisions about 
time, by stress and emotion or by complexity (and cognitive limitations): 
“[P]eople are “boundedly rational,” which simply refers to the fact that human cognitive abilities 
are limited. What this means is that human beings end up taking mental short cuts to help them 
make reasonably good decisions that provide them with more or less acceptable results, but 
results that may not necessarily maximize their wealth.”172 
The literature on behavioural economics and the findings of the OFT reveals that individuals 
often lack clear, stable or well-ordered preferences. The thrust of empirical work since the 
1960’s in a variety of approaches is that the rational consumer is a fiction.173 Ben-Shahar 
provides a more frank account of the reality of consumer non-readership: 
“Real people don’t read standard form contracts. Reading is boring, incomprehensible, alienating, 
time consuming, but most of all pointless. We want the product, not the contract. Besides, lots of 
people bought the product or the service along with the same contract and seem happy enough, so 
we presume that there must be nothing particularly important buried in the contract terms… Still, 
it is surprising how deep the unwillingness of contracts commentators to reconcile with this 
reality is. Rather, it is now a standard view to confront the unreadness reality with myths, 
fictions, and presumptions, all intended to preserve a conceptual apparatus that fits a world in 
which transactors know all the terms.”174 
As alluded to above in section II, whether consumers read contracts or not is irrelevant if they are 
difficult to understand. Would most consumers understand a term stating that “when you give us 
consent, you grant us a nonexclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sub-
licensable (through multiple tiers) right to exercise the copyright, publicity, and database rights 
(but no other rights) you have in the content, in any media known now or in the future?”175 
According to The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) which measures literacy in various 
domains, data from the period 1994-1998 revealed that less than 20 percent of the UK adult 
population reached the standard judged necessary “to deal with standard consumer contracts, 
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such as car rental agreements and insurance contracts.”176 Studies reveal that the language used 
in most standard-form contracts is understandable only by individuals with university degrees, 
which does not account for many contracting parties, particularly consumers:177 
“[M]andated disclosures are regularly written at forbidding reading levels. Financial privacy 
notices are written at third or fourth-year college reading level…over 40 million adults are 
functionally illiterate, and another 50 million have marginal literacy skills…only 3-4% of the 
population can understand the language in which contracts are drafted.”178 
The dangers of non-readership in respect of consumer contracts are exacerbated in the local 
context given the high levels of illiteracy in South Africa. According to Statistics South Africa 
the 2011 mid-year South African population stood at 50, 59 million.179 According to the National 
Reading Strategy180 published in February 2008 by the South African Department of Education 
levels of reading ability across the country are shockingly low with many homes and classrooms 
having no books.181 Teacher incompetency, a lack of access to libraries (only 7 percent of 
schools have library space stocked with books) and dire teaching conditions exacerbate the 
illiteracy challenge in South Africa.182 As explained above, most standard-form contracts are 
understandable only by individuals with university degrees. However, according to the 
Monitoring Learning Achievement (MLA) Survey, approximately 40 percent of adults 
interviewed had not completed primary education and about 60 percent had either not completed 
primary school, or had not achieved education levels higher than primary school.183 Most 
standard consumer agreements are drafted in English, but many consumers only have it as a 
second or third language.184 Consequently their understanding of such contracts may not be at a 
level sufficient for properly comprehending documents of this nature.185 
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In terms of section 40 of the Consumer Protection Act186 it is unconscionable for a supplier 
knowingly to take advantage of the fact that a consumer was substantially unable to protect the 
consumer's own interests because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability 
to understand the language of an agreement, or any other similar factor. While Jacobs, Stoop and 
Van Niekerk submit that this provision will, in effect, place a heavy burden on suppliers to 
ensure that consumers understand agreements, it must be emphasised that illiteracy or an 
inability to understand the language of an agreement are not sufficient for relief under this 
provision.187 As Du Plessis explains: 
“[T]hese weaknesses must result in consumers being substantially unable to protect their own 
interests, and the supplier must knowingly take advantage of this weakness. Thus, the supplier 
would probably act unconscionably if the consumer indicates to the supplier that he or she is 
illiterate or does not understand the language used in an agreement, and the supplier nonetheless 
seeks to enforce the agreement, without taking any steps to indicating how it affects the 
consumer’s interests. The provision does not require that the supplier must in each instance take 
steps to enquire whether the consumer is in fact illiterate or unable to understand the 
language.”188 
It is clear from the above exposition that creative judicial reasoning on the part of our courts, so 
as to ensure greater fairness and protection to the unwitting signatory when faced with claims of 
mistake in contracting, is most certainly welcome and clearly required, particularly when the 
contract in question is one of necessity. This is because in many circumstances, as will be 
elaborated on in section V below, it is precisely the very necessary nature of the goods or 
services in question which trigger various inherent behavioural biases which lead the consumer 
to, and it is submitted, reasonably, not read the contractual terms in question. In section V below 
I will proceed to illustrate that increased fairness towards the unwitting signatory in the context 
of contracts of necessity is not only required in light of various psychological factors and 
behavioural biases at play at the time of contracting (discussed above), but is also warranted in 
terms of our courts constitutional mandate in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution to 
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develop the common law in light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the 






5.1 THE DANGERS OF ADHERING TO THE STRICT APPLICATION OF THE 
CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR RULE  
Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. The Bill of Rights, as the Constitution proclaims, 'is 
a cornerstone' of our constitutional democracy; 'it enshrines the rights of all people in our country 
and affirms the democratic [founding] values of human dignity, equality and freedom'. In the 
discussion that follows, I will attempt to outline the manner in which the strict application of the 
caveat subscriptor rule in the context of contracts of necessity may implicate the fundamental 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. 
5.2 CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES OF FREEDOM 
AND DIGNITY 
The classical liberal theory of contract and the doctrine of freedom of contract are based upon the 
premise that both parties to a contract are bargaining from positions of equal strength, and that 
each is free to accept and reject any terms that the other might wish to impose in the contract.189 
As Rakoff pointed out in an influential article, “freedom of contract has long been defined in 
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terms of the separation of the market and the state, private and public law; at its fullest reach, it is 
the doctrine of laissez faire.”190 
However, the classical liberal theory of contract and the doctrine of freedom of contract fail to 
take into account that true equality rarely exists. It also fails to take into account the fact that 
many contracts are the result of necessity:  
“A man has to make contracts in order to live. He is forced to purchase goods, to hire or acquire a 
home, to obtain employment, to exercise professional skills or to train to acquire such skills. Even 
a rich man who has no need to be an employee has to invest his wealth. The rich, like the poor, 
have almost no freedom in negotiations…the fact that one is able to forecast the terms of 
everyday contracts indicates, it is submitted, that the pure doctrine of freedom of contract lacks 
practical validity. This is particularly so precisely because freedom of contract will be absent, to a 
lesser or greater extent, in areas that affect the individual in his most common social activities. 
Since men have to buy necessities, one might say that the consumer is compelled to contract upon 
particular terms and that, in a loose sense, he is the victim of compulsion.”191 
Consequently, it is submitted that, to use a framework characterized and fueled by the principles 
of the classical liberal theory of contract and the doctrine of freedom of contract in dealing with 
standard-form consumer contracts in circumstances of necessity or compulsion “is to err both in 
valuing highly a claim to freedom that is inapposite, and to overlook the elements of liberty that 
are actually at stake”:192 
“Far from enforcement of the organization’s standard-form terms furthering fundamental human 
values, the standard document grows out of and expresses the needs and dynamics of the 
organisation…Emphasis on the standard analysis…obscures the manner in which individual 
freedom really is at stake…What the courts should say is that enforcing boilerplate terms 
trenches on the freedom of the adhering party. Form terms are imposed on the transaction in a 
way no individual adherent can prevent, and a major purpose and effect of such terms is to ensure 
that the drafting party will prevail if the dispute goes to court.”193 
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The inequality of society and the disparity of wealth and resources that exists in South Africa 
render the freedom of all contractants something of a fallacy.194 Similarly abroad, the Crowther 
Committee, in its report on the laws and practices in the United Kingdom, found that the concept 
of freedom of contract has little meaning in consumer transactions.195 The theme of standard-
form contracts and the resultant powerlessness on the part of consumers also resonates through 
the minority judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier: 
“Prolix standard-form contracts undermine rather than support the integrity of what was actually 
concluded between the parties. They unilaterally introduce elements that were never in reality 
bargained for, and that had nothing to do with the actual bargain. It may be said that far from 
promoting autonomy, they induce automatism. The consumer's will does not enter the picture at 
all. Indeed, it could be contended that the question has moved from being one of whether Judges 
should impose their own subjective and undefined preferences in this field, to one of whether 
their own vision has become so clouded by anachronistic doctrine as to prevent them from seeing 
objective reality.”196 
The accuracy of Sachs’s assertion that the consumer’s will does not enter the picture at all when 
contracting by means of standard-form cannot be gainsaid, especially when the contract entered 
into by the consumer is one of necessity or circumstantial compulsion. It is absolutely vital to 
take cognizance of the fact that in a modern society such as ours many services (water, 
electricity, telephones and transportation, to name a few) may be regarded as necessities and that 
to the large majority of South Africans the pure doctrine of freedom of contract is merely an 
illusion.197 
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5.3 CONTRACTUAL AUTONOMY AND THE VALUE OF DIGNITY 
Of the values that underlie the 1996 Constitution, that of freedom logically appears most relevant 
to contractual autonomy.198 Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have 
made it clear the value of freedom encapsulates contractual autonomy. For instance, in Brisley v 
Drotsky199 Cameron JA held that “contractual autonomy is part of freedom.”200 However, 
perhaps more controversially, Cameron JA argued that “[s]horn of its obscene 
excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of dignity”201 and has the 
potential, if employed carefully, of enhancing individual dignity and self-respect.202 In 
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Barkhuizen v Napier,203 Chief Justice Ngcobo echoed the sentiments shared by Cameron JA by 
stating that “[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own 
detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity”,204 while Sachs J noted that 
“freedom of contract has been said to lie at the heart of [the] constitutionally prized values of 
dignity and autonomy.”205 
The notion of dignity displays a “perplexing capacity to pull in several directions and may 
accordingly fulfill very different roles.”206 On the one hand, an ‘empowerment-based’ 
conception of dignity enhances individual liberty by locating dignity in the ‘capacity for 
autonomous action’ and, accordingly, holding that dignity is enhanced by the protection of 
autonomous choices.207 An ‘empowerment-based’ conception of dignity is conducive to and 
supports a law of contract that is based on individual autonomy and that accordingly “reflects the 
pillars of the so-called classical law of contract, such as consensuality, freedom of contract and 
the strict enforcement of agreements seriously entered into.”208 
On the other hand, a ‘constraint-based’ conception of dignity is founded on the recognition of the 
intrinsic moral worth of all human beings, which is deserving of protection even if it places a 
constraint on freedom – that is, any exercise of autonomy that undermines basic human dignity is 
unacceptable.209 A ‘constraint-based’ conception of dignity “may subvert rather than enhance 
choice”210 by implying that society should not tolerate exercises of autonomy that affront human 
dignity. 
It is submitted that South Africa’s caring and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces 
everyone and accepts people for who they are and, particularly in light of our apartheid legacy, it 
is more likely that an approach to the fundamental constitutional value of human dignity which 
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views it as constraint-based will be favoured. According to Bhana and Pieterse, “the 
Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence lends support to such a proposition”:211 
“[Our] court[s] seems to ascribe to a collectivist notion of dignity that is grounded in the equal 
moral worth of all humans and that encompasses the material preconditions for a dignified 
existence through an explicit acknowledgement of the link between intrinsic individual worth and 
the material context within which an individual finds herself in society.”212 
It was made clear in the discussion above that for the large majority of South Africans the 
principle of freedom of contract is merely an illusion. The circumstances of necessity that many 
South Africans find themselves in on a daily basis render the notion of contractual autonomy 
little more than a fallacy. Consequently it would be adding insult to injury to make the many 
vulnerable and poor South African consumers to feel “that arcane, lawyer-made and highly 
technical rules beyond their ken leave them with a sense of having been cheated out of their 
rights by the big enterprises with which they perforce have to do business.”213 
While a court might say there is a contract based on the reliance of the contract enforcer, it is 
submitted that the court must also take into consideration the fact that today people (for various 
reasons often not readily apparent) habitually sign contracts without reading (as shown above in 
section IV) and the fact that the signatory may very well have appended his or her signature to 
the contractual document in circumstances of necessity, and therefore may not have acted ‘freely 
and voluntarily’ in any true sense. Our courts must also consider the fact that one of the main 
reasons why individuals (particularly consumers) enter into unread contracts is precisely because 
of the lack of any real freedom or choice in the circumstances. 
Consequently, to suggest that one acts freely in such circumstances of necessity or compulsion is 
to undermine individual autonomy; to mock one’s sense of freedom and to diminish dignity. 
Individuals are relegated to a position where they are treated as mere automatons thus inducing 
consumer automatism and, contrary to the foundation of any understanding of dignity, are used 
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as a means to an end rather than being used as an end in themselves.214 In this manner, the strict 
application of the caveat subscriptor rule in circumstances of necessity may implicate the values 
of freedom and dignity and will run counter to the constraint-based conception of dignity which 
our Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence endorses. Consumer protection relates not only to 
things, services and money, but also to feelings, and the dignity and moral citizenship of people 
who expend almost all their scarce resources on the daily necessities of life.215 The open and 
democratic society envisaged by our Constitution could not allow people to feel diminished as 
human beings because technical rules beyond their understanding seem to be robbing them of 
their rights.216 The mere fact that contractual provisions, designed by suppliers and embodied in 
standard format, become the norm in countless consumer contracts does not necessarily mean 
that such contracts are an expression of so-called freedom of contract.217 The existence of such a 
norm would indeed seem to argue the opposite.218 It is submitted that contracts, market practices 
and the continued application of the caveat subscriptor rule should, at the very minimum, not 
diminish human dignity, human capacity and self-reliance. 
5.4 CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR AND THE VALUE OF EQUALITY 
The private law’s endorsement of inequality is best illustrated in contractual transactions where 
one of the parties transacts from an overwhelming position of strength.219 When the caveat 
subscriptor rule is enforced in conjunction with the sanctity of contract doctrine to uphold harsh 
and oppressive standard-form contracts in circumstances of necessity, then the private law is in 
effect facilitating an abuse of power by the party in the stronger bargaining position.220 
Companies that use standard-form contracts usually acquire the services of a legal advisor to 
draft the terms and conditions of the document and consequently the draftsman is thus concerned 
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with incorporating all the terms that are beneficial to the company – usually to the disadvantage 
of the consumer.221 According to Justice Sachs: 
“Their objective is not to record negotiated terms but to be as un-prominent as possible so as to 
provide the least possible distraction from finalising the contract, while securing the greatest 
obligatory reach for the consumer and the most-reduced prospect of liability for the provider. 
Thus, while businesspeople can get their lawyers to scrutinise the small print with professional 
lenses and advise accordingly, ordinary consumers cannot be expected to do the same. The result 
is that much of the contract is in reality not a record of what was agreed upon but a superimposed 
construction favouring one side.”222 
In an attempt to protect their client from all possible contingencies, a contract is produced which 
more often than not surpasses the basic requirements of the company and abuses every possible 
opportunity permitted by the law.223 According to Hopkins, the result is more than simply a 
contract containing harsh provisions to the detriment of the adhering party: 
“[I]t is objectionable because in most cases the adhering party has no bargaining power to 
negotiate out of the prejudice resultant from the oppressive terms of the document. Consumers 
are forced to either take-it-or-leave-it on the terms offered. In countries like South Africa, this 
take-it-or-leave-it attitude endorsed by the law in wholly inadequate and hugely damaging to the 
welfare of the country’s vulnerable majority.”224 
The author goes on to state most tellingly: 
“Whilst it is true that the exploitation of historically disadvantaged and currently unsophisticated 
consumers is not a problem unique to South Africa, the apartheid legacy is such that the majority 
of South Africans are either burdened by poverty or else they are illiterate. Both of these factors 
discriminate economically and socially in such a way that these vulnerable consumers become 
particularly susceptible to an abuse of power by unscrupulous capitalists in superior bargaining 
positions.”225 
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Two species or conceptions of the concept of equality are recognized by our Constitution: 
‘Formal equality’ simply requires that “all persons are equal bearers of rights and does not take 
into account the actual social and economic disparities between groups and individuals.”226 
‘Substantive equality’, on the other hand, “requires a consideration of the actual social, economic 
and political conditions of groups and individuals in order to determine whether the 
Constitution’s commitment to equality is being upheld.”227 
It cannot be gainsaid that South Africa’s Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence embodies a 
rejection of the notion of ‘formal equality’, opting instead for a substantive understanding of 
equality.228 Indeed, one of the clearest indications that the substantive conception of equality is 
envisaged by the Constitution is the declaration in s 9(2) that “equality includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.”229 
The right to equality is the foundational tool in the achievement of our constitutional 
democracy’s ultimate vision – ‘transformation’. The Constitution does not use the term but, 
according to the Constitutional Court, nevertheless implicitly declares its commitment to 
transformation in a number of places.230 This commitment requires an understanding of the 
constitutional value of equality as a process towards the goal of an equal society.231 
However, according to Jordaan, “[a]lthough the Constitution creates the possibility that private 
persons can be obliged by subsequent legislation to promote substantive equality in specific 
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ways, the Constitution does not place a general positive duty on private persons to promote the 
achievement of equality.”232 The author continues as follows: 
“Private persons are only prohibited from unfairly discriminating against other persons. Even if 
the terms of the contract favours the contracting party with most resources unreasonably, this fact 
per se does not embody some kind of differentiation that is “based on attributes or characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or 
to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner” and will therefore not constitute unfair 
discrimination. The fact that the Constitution does not place a general positive duty on private 
persons to promote substantive equality cannot be altered by the court’s duty, as contained in the 
so-called seepage clause [that is, section 39(2) of the Constitution], to promote the spirit, object 
and purport of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law. To argue, based on this duty, 
that the court must develop the common  law so as to impose a general positive duty on private 
persons to promote substantive equality to the detriment of contractual autonomy, firstly goes 
completely beyond the intention of the equality clause, and secondly has a selective and isolated 
focus on only the equality clause.”233 
While there may not exist a positive duty on private parties to promote substantive equality, this 
does not detract from the fact that our courts, firstly, must not allow the inequality that does exist 
between contractual parties from being exacerbated or further entrenched and, secondly, must 
not be prevented from attempting, through creative judicial reasoning, to restore the equality 
imbalance that does exist. It is submitted that surely our courts are under such a duty when 
applying the caveat subscriptor rule, for to argue otherwise would be to turn a blind eye to the 
reality of the vast difference in the power balance between contracting parties, as well as the fact 
that consumers cannot understand and do not actually assent to the terms of the consumer 
contracts they sign, particularly in the context of consumer contracts of necessity. In this respect 
the words of our Deputy Chief Justice are worth noting: 
“It is now well beyond contest that our Constitution has set itself the mission to transform society 
in the public and private spheres. The exercise of public power, and indeed of private power, in a 
manner that impinges on the entrenched rights or in a way that is inconsistent with the 
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foundational democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom may very well attract 
constitutional consequences.”234 
To the extent that almost all contracting now takes place by means of standard-form contracts, 
drafted by legal advisors on behalf of the stronger party and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
to consumers who have little (if any) bargaining power, the strict application of the caveat 
subscriptor rule, in circumstances where the contract entered into was one of necessity, will 
function exclusively to serve the interests of the contract enforcer at the expense of the signatory, 
who, in light of the various undetected and often overlooked psychological factors and 
behavioural biases at play at the time of contracting (discussed in section IV above), may 
reasonably not have read or understood all the terms of the contract. It is submitted that in such 
instances, the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule will not only serve as an instrument 
to perpetuate inequality but may also have the effect of locking the weakest members of our 
society in a cycle of oppression. The South African Constitution “intends a not fully defined but 
nonetheless unmistakable departure from liberalism towards an empowered model of democracy 
with a goal of real substantive equality and distribution.”235 Preferences are virtually required 
under this approach.236 The strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule may not only end up 
diminishing freedom and liberty, it may reinforce and worsen the vast inequality in the 
distribution of power and resources between consumers and suppliers in a manner that offends 
our conception of distributive justice and restitutionary equality. 
5.5 CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF ‘PRIVATE 
LEGISLATION’ 
In the 2008 Durban and Coast Local Division case of Den Braven SA (Pty) Ltd v Pillay and 
another,237 Wallis JA expressed the view that power vested in the three spheres of government 
identified in s 40(1) of the Constitution and that “private citizens do not make law.”238 In a 
critical response, Davis J in Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff and Another239 
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described Wallis JA’s assessment as “the mischaracterisation of the law fashioned by private 
power.”240 Davis J held that “private power in South Africa is also accountable to the principles 
of the Constitution”241 and quoted with approval the following passage as per Madala J in Du 
Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another:242 
“Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society in which the ravages of apartheid, 
disadvantage and inequality are just immeasurable. The extent of the oppressive measures in 
South Africa was not confined to government/individual relations, but equally to 
individual/individual relations. In its effort to create a new order, our Constitution must have been 
intended to address these oppressive and undemocratic practices at all levels. In my view our 
Constitution starts at the lowest level and attempts to reach the furthest in its endeavours to 
restructure the dynamics in a previously racist society.”243 
The challenge of our Constitution, according to Davis J, is therefore “not to reproduce 
uncritically the shibboleths of the past, but to transform (as opposed to abolish or ignore) legal 
concepts in the image of the Constitution.”244 It is submitted that the caveat subscriptor rule is 
but one of the concepts of our contract law which must be transformed and shaped in light of the 
image of the Constitution. 
Although his article antedated the growth of the consumer protection movement, Friedrich 
Kessler’s ‘Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thought about Freedom of Contract’ expressed clearly 
the fears of later writers concerning the use of private contracts as an instrument of corporate 
power:245 
“Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all members of the 
community will be able to make use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by 
protecting the unequal distribution of property, does nothing to prevent freedom of contract from 
becoming a one-sided privilege. Society, by proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it 
will not interfere with the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract enables 
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more important, to legislate in a 
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substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms. 
Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful 
industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own 
making upon a vast host of vassals.”246 
South Africa’s liberal, or 'social democratic’, Constitution endorses aspirations of equality, 
redistribution and social security.247 In addition to multiculturalism, paying close attention to 
gender and sexual identity and placing an emphasis on participation and governmental 
transparency, the extension of democratic ideals into the 'private sphere' has also been described 
as an essential feature of the South African experiment.248 To this end, the words of Justice 
Didcott are worth noting: 
“No one familiar with the stark reality of South Africa and the power relationships in its society 
can believe that protection of the individual only against the state can possibly bring [the] benefits 
[of an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality].”249 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice Sachs in his evaluation of the legal status of 
standard-form contracts in Barkhuizen v Napier:250 
“A conception of contractual freedom modelled on the opposition between individual and state is 
inadequate in industrialised, organised and institutionalised society. Institutions other than the 
state can and do dominate the individual within the framework of private law as ordinarily 
conceived.”251 
According to Klare, the Constitution intends to “irradiate democratic norms and values into the 
so-called “private sphere”, particularly the market, the workplace and the family.”252 However, 
in the context of the present review, standard form consumer contracts are essentially 
undemocratic ‘private legislation’, imposed upon consumers by large private organizations.253 
Indeed the power sometimes exercised by large banks and insurance companies is every bit as 
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oppressive as the power exercised by the state. Consider the following example put forward by 
Hopkins: 
“[I]n scenario A, parliament, from its position of strength, legislates to bind those subordinate to 
its authority; in scenario B, a powerful non-statal institution (like a bank or an insurance 
company) contracts in standard-form to bind the meek who are subject to its will. The company 
effectively legislates the terms of the agreement in a standard-form document. There are 
frightening similarities between these two scenarios. The only real difference, from a 
constitutional law perspective, is that in scenario A the strong is an organ of the state.”254 
Commenting on the American context of the early 1970’s, Slawson estimates that “standard-
form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts made.”255 
However, “the overwhelming proportion of standard forms are not democratic because they are 
not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the consumer or business recipient to whom they 
are delivered.”256 Most consumers would have a tough time recalling when last they contracted 
other than by standard form and apart from casual oral agreements, they probably never have.257 
However if they are lively and active, chances are that they contract by non-negotiated standard 
form numerous times a day:258 Credit card applications, car rental leases, air travel tickets, credit 
agreements and numerous other agreements are expressed in printed form from which no 
deviation is possible.259 Suppliers and consumers are aware of this contractual reality, and both 
know that printed contractual documentation is not to be questioned.260 
Standard-form contracts have been used “to control and regulate the distribution of goods from 
producer all the way down to the ultimate consumer”261 and “have become one of the many 
devices to build up and strengthen industrial empires.”262 Consequently, in the current South 
African context, it becomes apparent just how vulnerable the weakest in our society are to 
exploitation. The strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule in circumstances of necessity 
                                                          
254 Hopkins (note 131 above) 159. 
255 WD Slawson ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’ (1971) 84 Harvard Law 
Review 3 529, 529. See also, Ramsay (note 152 above) 159. 
256 Slawson (note 149 above) 530. 
257 Hopkins (note 131 above) 155. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Van Eeden (note 82 above) 75. 
260 Ibid. 




may work to the detriment of the most vulnerable members of our society and simultaneously 
endorse the imposition of ‘private legislation’ in the form of standard form contracts while 
reinforcing the abuse of private power in a manner that is contrary to the image and aspirations 
of South Africa’s transformative Constitution.  
In light of the modern realities surrounding consumer transactions, the various psychological 
factors and behavioural biases which come into play at the time of contracting (discussed in 
section IV above) as well as the possible dangers, from a constitutional perspective, in adhering 
to a strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule, particularly in the context of contracts of 
necessity, it is submitted that our courts should not be confined to distinct categories of 
exceptions when adjudicating along the lines of contractual mistake. In section VI that follows, I 
will propose a new basis for escaping the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule in the 
context of contracts of necessity, as defined in the introduction to this paper, which will be 
grounded in public policy so as to provide our courts with a greater discretion or room to 





6.1 A NEW GROUND FOR ESCAPING THE STRICT APPLICATION OF THE 
CAVEAT SUBSCRIPTOR RULE AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The notion of public policy as a ground for declaring a contract invalid or unenforceable in South 
African contract law has developed radically in respect of our post-constitutional dispensation. 
While determining the content of public policy was once fraught with difficulties, this is no 
longer the case, as expounded by Justice Ngcobo in the seminal judgment of Barkhuizen v 
Napier:263 
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“Since the advent of our constitutional democracy, public policy is now deeply rooted in our 
Constitution and the values that underlie it…the values of human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law…What public 
policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must now be determined by 
reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to the values enshrined 
in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, therefore, unenforceable…the proper 
approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether the term 
challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, 
those found in the Bill of Rights.”264 
In coming to its conclusion, the court laid down a two-stage public policy test determining the 
fairness of enforcing contractual rights in the light of applicable constitutional values. However, 
a crucial aspect of the case that is often overlooked when considering the two-stage public policy 
test pronounced by the court is the fact that it was formulated in the context of determining the 
reasonableness of a time-bar clause which restricted access to court. Consequently, the 
majority’s approach to application of the Bill of Rights to private contracts has led to a situation 
where courts (and litigating parties) have, subsequent to Barkhuizen, expressed the view that the 
central question in a challenge to the validity of a provision in a contract is whether or not it is 
fair to allow a party to the contract to terminate on the basis of that provision or avoid the 
enforcement of the provision being challenged.265 
However, in Breedenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa266 Harms JA held that 
there is no such thing as a core value of fairness in the Bill of Rights and that there is no such 
thing as an overarching principle of fairness in contract which would allow for a contract to be 
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challenged simply on the basis of it being unfair.267 Nevertheless, Harms JA did suggest that 
where there is an identifiable constitutional value (dignity, equality or freedom) which is actually 
implicated by the provision being challenged, then one may be able to claim that unfairness 
should provide a basis to challenge the provision, but it must be brought under the umbrella of an 
identifiable constitutional value.268 The question that then arises is whether we can we now say 
that an unwitting signatory can challenge the enforcement of a contractual term on the basis that 
enforcement would be unfair, where the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule in 
circumstances of necessity would implicate a constitutional value. 
While enforcement of the caveat subscriptor rule would mean that a court might hold that all the 
terms of the contract are enforceable against the signatory (based in the reasonable reliance of 
the contract enforcer), the enforcement of a contractual term which the signatory claims to have 
had no knowledge of at the time of contracting or no appreciation as to the legal consequences 
thereof, may offend against public policy as the signatory may not have exercised any real 
contractual autonomy when entering into the transaction and the enforcement of such a 
contractual term on the basis of caveat subscriptor may serve to perpetuate inequality. The 
enforcement of the contractual provision would be challenged on the basis of it being unfair, but 
such a challenge to the contractual provision would be brought under the umbrella of the 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality.  
In order to succeed, the unwitting signatory would first have to establish that the contract in 
question was in fact a ‘contract of necessity’ in the sense that the contract involved the 
attainment of everyday essential goods or services, on which a variety of consumers with 
different needs rely, but to which they give little or no attention primarily due to the fact that the 
goods or services in question are a necessity. The signatory would have to provide a substantial 
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basis for showing that the goods or services in question were not merely a luxury or optional 
convenience and that the contract was concluded out of necessity. In laying such a basis the 
signatory may require the court to consider the following factors: whether the contract in 
question was a standard-form contract; whether the provision being challenged was offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis; the font size in respect of the contractual term in question; whether the 
clause was on the reverse side of the contract; the length and complexity of the contract term 
being challenged; the relevant bargaining power of the parties; the reasonable cost for the 
consumer to search for and deliberate on the term in question; the reasonable costs of legal 
advice in respect of the meaning and effect of the term; the signatories time limits when entering 
into the contract; the signatories financial resources; the signatories educational history, 
computational proficiency and memory capacity; the signatories ability to gather information and 
perform extensive calculations in order to produce a rational decision during the contracting 
process.  
Once the court has accepted that the contract in question is in fact one of necessity, the court 
must thereafter ask whether, in light of the factors stated above and in conjunction with the 
various psychological factors and behavioural biases at work at the time of contracting 
(discussed in section IV), it is reasonable to have expected the average South African consumer 
to have (1) read the contractual term in question or (2) understood the legal effect and meaning 
of the contractual term in question. It is submitted that should the court find that it is 
unreasonable to have expected the average South African consumer to have read or understood 
the term in question, then enforcement of the provision in question would be contrary to public 
policy as the consumer would have acted out of circumstantial compulsion or necessity rather 
than ‘freedom of contract’ in the classical liberal sense. Enforcement of the term would not only 
be unfair, but would also implicate the fundamental constitutional values of freedom and dignity 
as the court would be turning a blind eye to uncontrollable and intrinsic consumer deficiencies 
and the consumer would be treated as a mere automaton and as a means to an end for the 
supplier rather than an end in themselves. The consumer, who’s only choice would be to contract 
on the terms stipulated by the supplier or go without the necessary goods or services, would be 
contracting from an unequal bargaining position by default and therefore the strict application of 
the caveat subscriptor rule in such circumstances of necessity may not only end up diminishing 
freedom and dignity, it may reinforce and worsen the vast inequality in the distribution of power 
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and resources between consumers and suppliers in a manner that offends our conception of 
distributive justice and restitutionary equality.  
It must be borne in mind however, that I am not advocating for a new approach to challenge the 
validity of a contract on the basis of public policy. Rather, I am encouraging the development of 
a new basis for escaping the strict application of the caveat subscriptor rule, particularly in the 
context of contracts of necessity, which will operate alongside the traditionally recognized 
exceptions to the caveat subscriptor rule in order to challenge the enforcement of a particular 
contractual provision, which, in light of the numerous factors stated above and the various 
psychological factors and consumer behavioural biases at play at the time of contracting, would, 
in all probability, not have been read and/or understood by the average South African consumer. 
It is submitted that such a development would provide our courts with greater discretion and 
room to maneuver when adjudicating along the lines of contractual mistake, would safeguard 
against judicial idleness by preventing the unwitting signatory from escaping an unread contract 
where the circumstances do not fall neatly into one of the recognized categories of exceptions 
and perhaps most importantly, would allow our courts to bring a more ‘human face’ to the law of 
contract. 
Whilst, by operation of the principle of freedom of contract, individuals are at liberty to conclude 
contracts with whom and on what terms they deem fit, and the courts will, by way of the 
principle pacta sunt servanda, generally enforce these contracts, our courts have deemed it 
necessary to retain a residual power to refuse to enforce the terms of a contract when to do so 
would be contrary to public policy.269 Our courts have always been fully prepared to reassess 
public policy and declare contracts invalid on that ground. In Breedenkamp v Standard Bank270 
Harms JA traced this residual power of the courts all the way back to Codex 2.3.6 which states 
that “it is a self-evident principle that contracts (pacta) concluded contrary to laws, imperial 
constitutions, or the boni mores, are of no force or effect”.271 In Sasfin v Beukes272 Smalberger 
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JA explained that courts have “the power to treat as void and to refuse in any way to recognise 
contracts and transactions which are against public policy or contrary to good morals.”273 
Determining whether or not an agreement was contrary to public policy requires a balancing of 
competing values. Matthew Kruger astutely describes the concept of public policy as follows: 
“Public policy means that a judge, when engaging public policy, is equipped with a ‘basket’ of 
policy considerations. From this ‘basket’ she is required, in a given case, to choose those 
considerations which are relevant to the facts of that case, and then to balance these 
considerations against each other so as to determine whether a particular contractual term should 
be enforced. The outcome of this identification and balancing process is what the courts term 
public policy.”274 
No doubt the more open-ended approach of dealing with the application of the caveat 
subscriptor rule as advocated for here may invoke a storm of criticism from legal scholars and 
commercial lawyers who, with their need for legal certainty, may find such an approach difficult 
to accept and who may harbor fears that such development would “disturb the equilibrium of 
interests that common law seeks to achieve and would sacrifice the legal certainty associated 
with the unfettered operation of well-oiled common law rules in favour of ad-hoc, unprincipled, 
subjective, abstract and value-based decision-making.”275 However, it is submitted that 
contingencies that are not insurmountable should not stand in the way of principle: “individuals 
should not be denied justice simply because this produces a temporary hassle for 
practitioners.”276 
“Lawyers often become trapped in a sterile argument about legal principles rather than settle 
down to solve the key problem of where justice lies. Law is sometimes seen as a mathematical 
formula. The formula is applied to a particular set of facts, and, if all the requirements of a 
recognized legal action are satisfied, the plaintiff succeeds. But if one of the elements is missing 
or suspect, the matter fails regardless of how aggrieved the poor individual in the street may feel. 
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Nowhere, I believe, is this more obvious than in the law of contract with its emphasis on 
principles such as caveat subscriptor and its rules of interpretation.”277 
Commenting on the importance of the pacta sunt servanda principle in our legal system Davis J 
in Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff278 held that “[m]anifestly, without this 
principle, the law of contract would be subject to gross uncertainty, judicial whim and an 
absence of integrity between the contracting parties.”279 However, while it is clear that there is 
great value and importance to be had in promoting certainty, it is equally important to recognize 
that certainty alone is not a consideration that can trump all other policy considerations in all 
circumstances.280 Legal certainty is not the only truism or foundational principle of our legal 
system: “[o]ur law, like all legal systems – indeed, like our Constitutions – prizes more than one 
ideal, more than one value, and aims for more than just one end.”281 
It is submitted that dogmatic adherence to legal rules such as caveat subscriptor for the sake of 
legal certainty and predictability will strip the common law of its inherent potential and 
consequently frustrate legal and social transformation:282 
“The drive towards closure, self-justification and self-serving certainty always seems to gain the 
upper hand in the course of time. It makes life easier, and making life easier, at least for oneself 
or ourselves, appears to be the first item on the agenda of humanity. This is the deeply sacrificial 
logic that underlies the law. Hence the reduction of principles of reasonableness, good faith and 
boni mores to blunt instruments that no longer cut into, but actually shield the self-serving 
tendencies of the law. Hence the need for revolutionary interventions that truly expose and resist 
the self-serving and status quo-entrenching tendencies of the law.”283 
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In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. One must remember, as Bhana and Pieterse 
correctly point out, “that the trade-off for temporarily reduced legal certainty is an alignment of 
common-law doctrine with the constitutional ethos which will serve not only to infiltrate formal 
rules with substantive justice, but also to relegitimize the common law”:284 
“[T]here is much less to fear than one may suppose when our legal world is brought into jeopardy 
by its re-evaluation through the values, the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights. The result is not to undermine the foundations of the law, to unsettle every rule, 
and to leave every existing right or entitlement in jeopardy. No doubt the exercise will reveal 
those rules and structures that do not have solid foundations. Those which cannot be supported by 
the values of the new constitutional dispensation are in jeopardy of being condemned. They will 
need to be replaced with rules which are supported by those values. Those rules which can be, or 






CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
All South African consumers would prefer to live in a society and economy where they can 
afford as much as they desire of all goods and services, such as food, housing, medical services 
and education for their children.286 However, the reality is that the daily existence of many South 
African consumers is characterized by struggle, poverty, famine and an absence of basic 
services. 
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“The realities of today’s marketplace…and readability research cry out for a new theory of 
consumer contract and statutory law that is based on reality. Consumer protection legislation 
should not be based on the false notion that documentary disclosures give consumers the ability 
to protect themselves when they enter into adhesion contracts. Consumer contract law should not 
be based on the false notion that by signing one of these form contracts, the consumer knows of, 
understands, and has assented to the terms of the writing. New approaches are needed to truly 
protect consumers and to give judges the ability to police consumer agreements…By holding on 
to the freedom-of-contract doctrine as the main common law component, and using disclosure 
laws as the main statutory component of consumer law, the legal system is engaging in the fiction 
of a free and informed market, while turning a blind eye to the realities of the marketplace and to 
the fact that consumers cannot understand and do not actually assent to the terms of the consumer 
contracts they sign.”287 
It is submitted that what is required is a revised understanding of the caveat subscriptor rule - an 
understanding that will ultimately result in adjudication in cases of mistake that is consistent 
with, and supportive of, our Constitution’s transformative hopes. The basis and underpinnings of 
the caveat subscriptor rule must be re-examined and built on the rock of democratic values 
embodied in the Constitution. This will not entail an abolishment of the rule. Rather, the rule will 
remain, but will remain having established a renewed foundation - it will remain because it will 
be worthy of serving the values of the new regime. I believe that the development of the common 
law along the lines encouraged above would be consistent with the objective normative value 
system underpinning our Constitution, and with the courts’ duty to develop the common law in 
light of the Bill of Rights and those very values.288 
Such an approach advocated above will deprive the consumer’s signature of the air of 
conclusiveness and finality with which it has hitherto been endowed by the common law. A 
supplier will no longer be able to assume that the court will enforce a consumer contract simply 
on the basis that, on being presented with a document bearing the consumer’s signature, the court 
will summarily accept the consumer’s signature on the document as conclusive proof that the 
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consumer had read, understood and assented to the terms of the contract.289 The supplier will no 
longer be able to assert that the court is precluded from looking behind the consumer’s signature 
and the standard form print, or that the fairness or unfairness of the contract is immaterial.290 
Ultimately, this will mean two things for judges:  
“[F]irstly, they will no longer be entitled to simply rely on judicial precedent when deciding a 
case; and second, they can longer limit their enquiry to the contractual capacity of the parties and 
the legality of the transaction. Instead they will now have to engage to some degree with issues of 
fairness and reasonableness as they will need to justify hard cases through a process of normative 
reasoning.”291 
In addition to the more open-ended approach proposed above for challenging the strict 
application of the caveat subscriptor rule in the context of contracts of necessity, there are 
certain practical methods by which the caveat subscriptor rule may be modified by our courts in 
order to ensure increased fairness towards the unwitting signatory who may have contracted out 
of necessity. The first method would entail a lowering of the threshold in respect of the 
reasonableness on the part of the unwitting signatory. As explained above in section III above, 
our courts have traditionally adopted the attitude that no relief will be granted where the 
mistaken party has signed recklessly, without first having read the terms of the contract. 
However, it is submitted that in light of the realities surrounding consumer non-readership our 
courts need to stop interpreting consumer non-readership as mere recklessness, but rather as a 
natural human condition. In Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers292 the 
mistaken signatory was a senior attorney, with 44 years' experience, who practised commercial 
law, did a fair amount of contract work and a fairly substantial amount of litigation.293 In 
Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd294 the mistaken signatory was an accomplished 
businesswoman of many years' standing who had signed an agreement as a surety without 
reading it.295 It is submitted that to simply say that these individuals are reckless is to move too 
quickly and to turn a blind eye to the reality of consumer transactions. Literature on psychology 
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and behavioural economics (as discussed in section IV) proves that there is something more at 
play here. Consequently, it is submitted that our common law needs to respond and develop 
according to human behavior as studies have shown that almost nobody reads consumer 
contracts and (more surprisingly perhaps) that “legal jargon, print density and font size are not 
key factors in consumers' decisions on whether to read their contracts.”296 Furthermore, cases 
such as Hartley and Langeveld suggest that education levels and the signatory’s profession are 
also not key factors in consumers' decisions on whether to read their contracts. Recently, even 
Judge Richard Posner (one of the greatest legal minds of his generation) admitted that he doesn’t 
read contracts before signing.297 
According to Professor Calamari, “[I]n the current era of mass marketing, a party may 
reasonably believe that he is not expected to read a standardized document and would be met 
with impatience if he did. In such circumstances an imputation that he assents to all of the terms 
in the document is dubious law.”298 It is submitted that in light of the modern realities 
surrounding consumer non-readership, this is even more so in the context of non-negotiated 
standard-form consumer contracts of necessity. 
Conversely to the first method for reform, the second method would entail the raising of the 
threshold in respect of the reasonableness of the reliance on the part of the contract enforcer. As 
explained above in section I, it is crucial that the contract assertor’s belief in consensus must be 
reasonable, because it is only a reasonable person that can rely on the doctrine of quasi-mutual 
assent. Where the contract being challenged is one of necessity and the factors mentioned above 
(standard-form, small font size, lengthily terms etc.) are present, the court must ask whether a 
reasonable person in the position of the contract enforcer would have (in light of the well-
established realities surrounding consumer non-readership as outlined in section IV) believed 
that the signatory, by signing such a contract of necessity in the circumstances, understood and 
intended to bind themselves to the particular term being challenged. By having to take into 
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297 See Mike Masnick ‘If Even The Best Legal Minds Don't Read Boilerplate Contracts... Why Are They Considered 
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account the realities surrounding consumer non-readership as well as factors such as the 
signatories’ financial resources, educational history and computational proficiency the court 
would require the contract enforcer to display a higher standard of reasonableness in respect of 
his or reliance on the signature of the unwitting signatory. 
It is important to bear in mind at this point that the reasonableness of the reliance on the part of 
the contract enforcer is determined objectively (alternatively, stated in terms of the doctrine of 
iustus error, the reasonableness of the mistake on the part of the signatory is determined 
objectively). Consequently, any fault the part of the signatory is irrelevant to the enquiry. This 
much was made clear in Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis299 where Harms AJA held that fault 
was not a requirement as there is little or no authority for such a requirement and that such a 
requirement had received much academic criticism and is unnecessary.300 According to Harms 
AJA the decisive question is whether “the party whose actual intention did not conform to the 
common intention expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his 
declared intention represented his actual intention?...To answer this question, a three-fold 
enquiry is usually necessary, namely, firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to one party's 
intention; secondly, who made that representation; and thirdly, was the other party misled 
thereby?”301 According to Harms AJA, “[t]he last question postulates two possibilities: Was he 
actually misled and would a reasonable man have been misled?”302  
It is submitted that, in light of the now well documented and widespread prevalence of consumer 
non-readership, the reasonable proferens with even a minimum level of experience of operating 
in the modern consumer market could not, objectively speaking, reasonably expect the average 
South African consumer entering into a contract of necessity to read and/or understand lengthy 
and complex contract terms, and more importantly, to understand the legal consequences of 
agreeing to such terms, unless such terms were specifically pointed out and explained in 
sufficient detail. Therefore, while the proferens may claim to have been misled by the signature 
of the signatory, it is difficult, where the contract was one of necessity and in light of the realities 
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surrounding consumer non-readership, to see how the reliance of the proferens would be 
reasonable. This brings us to the third possible method for reform. 
The third method would entail a development of the common law of misrepresentation in respect 
of unexpected terms or misleading documents. As explained in section I, our courts have already 
recognized that the use of misleading documents and unexpected terms in a document constitutes 
a form of misrepresentation with a duty to speak on the part of the contract enforcer. It is 
submitted that this area of our common law that can be developed to provide greater leeway for 
the unwitting signatory by requiring greater disclosure on the part of the contract enforcer. 
The SCA has already recognized in Absa Bank Ltd v Fouche303 that “[a] party is expected to 
speak when the information he has to impart falls within his exclusive knowledge (so that in a 
practical business sense the other party has him as his only source) and the information, 
moreover, is such that the right to have it communicated to him ‘would be mutually recognized 
by honest men in the circumstances.’”304 Three years later in Davids en Andere v ABSA Bank 
Bpk305 the court had to deal with a standard-form agreement of suretyship, which the clients of a 
bank had signed at the behest of the bank. The court held that no reasonable person would have 
believed that the clients, by signing such a document in the circumstances, understood and 
intended to bind themselves to the content thereof. The court went further and criticized the 
length of the sentences in the contract, pointing out that the sentences were each hundreds of 
words long. The court made the wry comment that even if the clients had read the agreement, it 
is doubtful whether they would have understood what they were reading due to this fact. The 
court then went on to hold that “public interest demanded that a complicated document of this 
nature had to be explained to the signatory, especially where the signing thereof could have such 
drastic consequences.”306 With a view to ensuring increased fairness and a greater level of 
protection towards the unwitting signatory, it is submitted that, in the spirit of Absa Bank Ltd v 
Fouche and Davids en Andere v ABSA Bank Bpk, our courts should place a far greater burden on 
suppliers of essential goods and services (who, it must be remembered, contract from a far 
greater bargaining position) to not only point out certain contractual terms such as exemption 
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clauses, but also to ensure that the consumer is fully aware of the meaning and legal 
consequences of being bound to lengthy and complex contract terms which could operate 
adversely to the interests to the consumer at the time of contracting and in the future. 
The fourth possible method for reform under the common law would involve the introduction of 
a rebuttable presumption, particularly when dealing with claims of mistake in the context of 
contracts of necessity. When the unwitting signatory claims mistake and the contract in question 
is one of necessity, then the onus could shift to the contract enforcer to prove why their reliance 
is reasonable. This would require the contract enforcer to bring evidence so prove why the 
unwitting signatory should be held bound to the particular term in the contract even though the 
contract was one of necessity and even though the latest findings on consumer psychology and 
behavioural economics suggests that the average South African consumer would not have read 
and/or understood the term in question. This may require the contract enforcer to prove, for 
example, that the specific clause being challenged was specifically pointed out and/or explained 
to the consumer and that there exists sufficient business reasons for including and enforcing the 
term. Some support for this suggestion for reform can be found in the Consumer Protection 
Act307 which has introduced so-called ‘black list’ and ‘grey list’ terms. According to Naude, “[a] 
black list is a list of prohibited terms which are invalid under all circumstances, whereas a grey 
list is a list of terms which may be unfair, but the final decision depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case.”308 Section 51 of the Act contains the ‘black list’ terms which are prohibited 
under all circumstances, while Regulation 44 of the Act provides the ‘grey list’ of terms which 
are presumed to be unfair. A supplier is permitted to include these ‘grey list’ terms in the 
contracts, however, in certain circumstances, the inclusion of these terms will be presumed to be 
unfair.309 Under the common law and in terms of section 48 of the Consumer Protection Act, the 
consumer would normally bear the onus of proving that a particular term in a contract is unfair. 
However, following the introduction of ‘grey list’ terms, the use of certain terms by the supplier 
of goods and services is presumed to be unfair in certain circumstances and the onus is on the 
supplier to be able to provide a justification for why the particular term has been included in the 
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contract and is necessary. It is submitted that our courts should introduce a similar shift in onus 
where a signatory claims mistake in respect of a particular contractual term and the contract in 
question is one of necessity. 
Fears that ‘uncertainty’ would result in our courts to be flooded by litigation and would 
ultimately stifle commercial traffic are exaggerated.310 As with all branches of common law, the 
degree of uncertainty in contract law is moderated through the doctrine of precedent.311 A solid 
set of rules will gradually develop over time if the open-ended approach and practical methods 
for reform suggested above are developed incrementally and applied carefully — thus, while the 
outcome may not be able to be foreseen with scientific accuracy, litigants will in most 
circumstances have a fair indication of what it may be.312 
“[T]he introduction of the Constitution has heralded a new legal era and it requires a re-think of 
all areas of the law. This is not to argue that the doctrine of precedent should be abandoned and 
that decisions should be based merely on what seems fair in the circumstances. But we do live in 
a world which is constantly changing…if we are to pay more than lip service to the notion that 
our common law is a vibrant living system, it is necessary for our courts to consider issues of 
equity and social policy. That we have a Constitution which emphasizes these values means that 
it is far easier for the courts to move away from strict adherence to an approach based on 
inflexible logic where solutions must be found in already existing pigeon holes. It must be 
accepted that in the short term this approach may lead to uncertainty, particularly in the law of 
contract, and that boundaries will have to be examined and established. But in the end this will 
hopefully revitalize our vibrant commercial legal system and so ensure that it is well capable of 
keeping up with the ingenious developments of modern commerce.”313 
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